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The Increased Use of
"Reconciliation" in Criminal Cases in
Central Asia: A Sign of Restorative
Justice, Reform or Cause for
Concern?
Cynthia Alkon'
"We have had great success with mediation. We have even had several
women marry these men. "
-Lawyer in Kyrgyzstan discussing reconciliation of rape cases.2
I. INTRODUCTION
This statement sums up the challenges lawyers, courts, legislatures, and
other policymakers face when discussing mediation, reconciliation, or the
use of other process alternatives in criminal cases in Central Asia. First,
1. Assistant Professor of Law at the Appalachian School of Law, previously Head of the Rule
of Law Unit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) from 2002-2006. The views expressed in this article
are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the OSCE. Special
thanks to Mr. Dmitry Nurumov, OSCE/ODIHR Rule of Law Coordinator in Central Asia for his
invaluable assistance in researching the Russian language sources including the applicable laws, for
analyzing the available statistics, and for his thoughtful comments and suggestions regarding the text
of this article in its various drafts. The clarity that exists in this article regarding the laws and
practices of each country is due to Mr. Nurumov's attention to detail. Any mistakes are the
responsibility of the author alone. Thank you also to Associate Professor Paula M. Young for her
organizational advice, editing assistance and her contribution to the discussion found in section V of
the article. She has allowed liberal use of the discussions found in her recent articles on mediator
grievance systems and mediator ethics. Earlier versions of this article were delivered as papers at
the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law Conference on "Modernization of
Criminal Justice Systems" on June 26-30, 2005, Edinburgh, Scotland and at the Law and Society
Annual Meeting in Baltimore, MD in July 2006. Thank you also to the Appalachian School of Law
for providing financial support towards the completion of this article.
2. A well-known woman lawyer, who will remain unnamed, made this statement during a
conference on reform of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code in Kyrgyzstan in March
2004.
many people in the legal community of Central Asia have different
understandings about the types of criminal cases appropriate for referral to
alternative processes in lieu of criminal prosecution. Second, many people
in the Central Asian legal community have attitudes about victims,
defendants, and certain types of crimes that differ significantly from the
attitudes held by the legal communities in other countries of the world. For
instance, in Central Asia, prosecutors, judges, and other actors in the
criminal justice system commonly understand sexual assault and rape as
crimes of passion and love, not of violence.3 In some parts of rural Central
Asia it is not uncommon for men to kidnap women to force them into
marriage. 4 These attitudes affect the types of cases referred to alternative
processes and the inadequate safeguards in place to protect victims of crime,
the rights of criminal defendants, and the integrity of these alternative
processes.
In evaluating the increased use of alternatives to criminal proceedings
throughout Central Asia, scholars and policymakers must understand the
different perspectives and attitudes that criminal justice professionals hold
towards both particular types of crime and the rights of victims and
defendants, and how these perspectives influence their choice of when or
how to use alternative processes. The international community must also
clearly understand these differences before embarking on any assistance
program to support or encourage the increased use of reconciliation or other
processes, mistakenly placed in the category of restorative justice processes.
However, with or without international assistance, legal professionals in
Central Asia increasingly support and use alternative procedures, primarily
"reconciliation," in lieu of traditional criminal prosecutions. 5 In recent years
Central Asian legislatures passed laws supporting the use of these alternative
3. See, e.g., Reconciled to Violence: State Failure to Stop Domestic Abuse and Abduction of
Women in Kyrgyzstan, 18 HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH 9 (2006), at 44-51 (detailing police attitudes in
Kyrgyzstan towards domestic violence), and at 86-125 (citing attitudes towards bride-kidnapping
including "tradition" and that the bride "consents" to the kidnapping and reporting experiences of
kidnapped women), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/kyrgyzstan0906/ (last visited Oct. 30,
2007).
4. See, e.g., Craig S. Smith, Abduction, Often Violent, a Kyrgyz Wedding Rite, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 2005, at Al. See also Cynthia Werner, The Rise of Non-Consensual Bride Kidnapping in
Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL ASIA: STATES AND SOCIETIES FROM
SOVIET RULE TO INDEPENDENCE 59-89 (Pauline Jones Luong ed., 2004).
5. See Jeffrey Thorn, Restorative Justice in Central Asia: A Critical Analysis and
Suggestions for the Future (2004) (on file with author). The study was conducted under a Chayes
Fellowship from Harvard Law School for the OSCE. See also infra Section VI.
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procedures. 6 Many professionals within the criminal justice system, notably
police officers and prosecutors, advocate the increased use of alternatives to
prosecution.7 Yet, the personal and institutional interests of criminal justice
professionals in the use of reconciliation directly conflict with the needs and
interests of crime victims and criminal defendants. From the perspective of
western restorative justice experts,8 the countries of Central Asia have
turned the values of the restorative justice movement on their head
reinforcing the weaknesses and abuses of the dysfunctional criminal systems
in which the alternative process must operate.
1I. THIS ARTICLE
Reconciliation, defined in Section VI below, provides the most common
alternative to criminal prosecutions in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan. 9 This article attempts to define and describe the different
6. CRIMINAL CODE [C. CRIM.] art. 67 (Kaz.); Law Number 221, Nov. 14, 2003; CRIMINAL
CODE [C. CRIM.] art. 66-1 (Uzb.); CRIMINAL CODE [C. CR1M.] art. 73 (Taj.) (Republic of Tajikistan
Law, May 17, 2004, No. 35) and infra Section VI.
7. Thorn, supra note 5, at 1, 9-14; see also infra note 20.
8. It is not easy to find an appropriate term to describe restorative justice as practiced in a
range of countries which are more than just "western" and which are oftentimes based on traditional
practices and drawing from native communities in those countries. For simplicity of prose, this
article will use the term "western" while recognizing that many of the practitioners of restorative
justice are in countries of the former Eastern Bloc, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, and from
communities in countries such as Canada and Australia, might prefer not being categorized as
"western." Later in this article examples given are specifically from the United States.
9. Turkmenistan was not invited to participate in the Nov. 2004 Conference (see discussion
regarding the Conference infra Section III and note 20). Turkmenistan is excluded from the analysis
in this article due to the relative difficulty in gathering information in the country and due to the
serious human rights situation in the country. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2005/61681.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2007). Freedom House publishes an annual survey ranking
countries according to their level of freedom and rates Turkmenistan as "not free" with political
rights and civil liberties both getting the lowest number available: a "7" out of "7" representing the
"least free." www.http://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005countryratings/ (last visited on
June 25, 2006). FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (Turkmenistan), http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=22&year-2005&country=6852 (last visited June 25, 2006). See also, Amnesty
International, Turkmenistan: the Clampdown on Dissent and Religious Freedom Continues May
2005 at 1, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/EUR610032005ENGLISH/$File/
EUR6100305.pdf. For an analysis of the political succession in Turkmenistan following the
December 21, 2006 death of President Saparamurad Niyazov, see JIM NICHOL, TURKMENISTAN'S
POLITICAL SUCCESSION: DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS ORDER
CODE RS22572, (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80682.pdf, Natalia
Antelava Leader's Death Leaves Uncertain Future, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
forms of reconciliation processes in these Central Asian countries. Section
IV briefly examines the history, economies, governments, and legal systems
including an outline of the criminal procedure of each country.
For comparative purposes, Section V briefly examines the development
of alternatives to criminal prosecution (generally known as restorative
justice) in western nations, by considering the proponents for change, the
underlying core values and ethical guidelines, and the types of cases that are
typically referred to restorative justice conferences.
Next this article, in Section VI, discusses reconciliation in each of the
four Central Asian countries by examining who makes the decisions in each
country to put a criminal case into reconciliation, what types of cases go to
reconciliation, whether they go pre- or post-conviction, and why they go to
reconciliation.
The article concludes, in Section VII, with an analysis of the problems
the reconciliation process creates and the significant risks the process poses
for vulnerable victims and for defendants with few human rights protections.
Section VII will describe the selection and training of intermediaries, 10 how
intermediaries conduct the reconciliation process and the presence or
absence of guiding core values and ethical standards. This section also
considers who may be present during the reconciliation and whether the
pacific/6202215.stm. Turkmenistan's human rights record does not set it entirely apart in the region.
Uzbekistan also suffers from serious human rights violations with conditions worsening following
the May 2005 events in Andijon. See infra Section IV; The International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan:
the Andijon Uprising, Asia Report No. 38 (May 25, 2005), http://www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?id=3469&l=I (last visited July 1, 2006); Report from the OSCE/ODIHR Trial
Monitoring in Uzbekistan Sep./Oct. 2005, available at www.osce.org/documents/odihr/
2006/04/18767.en.pdf (last visited June 25, 2006); C.J. Chivers & Ethan Wilensky-Lanford, Video of
Ill-fated Uzbek Rising Offers Haunting, Complex View, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at Al.
Participants from Uzbekistan attended the Nov. 2004 Conference, infra note 20.
10. This article will use the term "intermediary" and not the terms "neutral" or "mediator."
"Intermediary" is the literal translation into English from the Russian word posrednik, commonly
used to refer to intermediaries in commercial transactions who receive payment depending on the
final negotiated terms of the contract. Posrednik is also the most common Russian word used to
translate from the English word "mediator" and indicates the difficulty presented by a language
which does not have a commonly used word for mediator that means an impartial neutral third party
with no interest in the case. Interview with Dmitry Nurumov, OSCE/ODIHR Rule of Law
Coordinator in Central Asia, in Grundy, Va. (June 30, 2006). See also definitions in T. Eftemova.
Novyi tolkovo-slovoobrazovatel'nyi slovar' russkogo yazyka [New Explanatory and Word-
Formative Dictionary of the Russian language] 2001-2002, http://slovari.gramota.ru/
portal sl.html#efr and Tolkovyi slovar' zhivogo vleikorusskogo yazyka V. Dalya On-line [V. Dal'
Russian Explanatory Dictionary].(1998), http://vidahl.agava.ru/P170. HTM#31270. This article
explains, that one of the fundamental problems with current reconciliation practice in Central Asia is
the role the intermediaries play and the fact that intermediaries usually have an interest in the
outcome (most often that the parties reach agreement). See infra, Section VII. Intermediaries in
reconciliation are therefore rarely "neutral" as is understood in western restorative justice
terminology.
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participants have control over the process design and outcome and whether
the reconciliation is voluntary. Section VII also analyzes whether the
reconciliation process protects the rights of defendants by ensuring that
communications made in the reconciliation are confidential and precluded
from admission into evidence in later proceedings. This section ends by
examining the lack of safeguards to protect victims and defendants in
reconciliation processes in Central Asia.
Finally, the article concludes that the international community and
policymakers should not view the increased use of reconciliation in these
four Central Asian countries as a sign of reform or improvement in the
administration of the criminal justice systems in those countries. Instead,
observers should exercise great caution when discussing the expanded use of
reconciliation as an alternative to criminal prosecutions in Central Asia. In
current practice, the use of reconciliation fails to protect victims, fails to
protect defendants' rights, and provides additional opportunities for
prosecutorial, judicial, and police corruption.
III. THE DATA GATHERING PROCESS
Scholars, legal development workers, those in the international
community, and the general public have an extraordinarily difficult time
gathering information about how the legal systems work (or about virtually
any other topic) in Central Asia. " These countries have no equivalent to a
Freedom of Information Act. 12  The government closely guards the
distribution of basic statistics (such as numbers of people executed), treating
the data as a state secret. 13
11. See infra note 13 and 16 and Section VI (discussing the lack of available statistics on
reconciliation of criminal cases in Central Asia). This example illustrates the difficulty in finding
specific and reliable information about developments in Central Asia. Few international
organizations or development agencies have sufficient resources to engage in extensive monitoring
and instead monitor specific events, such as elections or the trials in Uzbekistan following the events
in Andijon. See supra note 9.
12. See, e.g., Global Environmental Outlook 2000, Europe and Central Asia: Environmental
Information and Education, http://www.grida.no/geo2000/english/0177.htm (access to
environmental information and the absence of Freedom of Information Acts in Europe and Central
Asia) (last visited October 30, 2007); OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, The Media
Situation in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turlonenistan and Uzbekistan (2002) (describing
how each country restricts journalists' access to information), available at http://foi.missouri.edu/
intemationalfoi/rep-media-ca-en.pdf (last visited October 30, 2007).
13. Uzbekistan still retains and uses the death penalty but does not release statistics on the
number of people sentenced to death or executed. Human Rights Department of the Office for
Scholars, lawyers, and policymakers face significant challenges in
gathering basic information about reconciliation of criminal cases in Central
Asia.
Police officers, prosecutors, and courts in Central Asia typically use
reconciliation as the alternative to criminal prosecution.14 No one institution
within the criminal justice system assumes responsibility for the regulation
or supervision of reconciliations.' 5 No one regularly assembles statistics
relating specifically to the process.' 6  No country has undertaken a
comprehensive study of its reconciliation practices. Some data suggests, but
none proves, that police, courts, and prosecutors are more frequently using
reconciliation and using it in a greater variety of cases.' 7 Discussions during
the November 2004 Conference held by the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights ("OSCE/ODIHR") clearly indicated that criminal justice
professionals in all four countries perceive an increase in the number of
cases disposed through reconciliation. 8
This article relies on four main sources of information: (1) the laws of
each county, including the constitutions and the criminal and criminal
procedure codes; (2) information gleaned at a conference conducted by the
OSCE/ODIHR in November 2004; (3) informal interviews conducted by
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), The Death Penalty in the OSCE Area (2005), available at
www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2005/09/16245_451 _en.pdf. The UN Human Rights Committee
specifically commented on the failure to release this information calling on Uzbekistan to change its
practice. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Uzbekistan, CCPR/CO/83/UZB, 26 April, 2005, 7,
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/ doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.CO.83.UZB.En?Opendocument. It is also not
uncommon for one institution within a country to opt not to share information with other institutions.
For example, the Prosecutor General's office may not share information on the number of cases filed
with the judiciary. This creates obvious problems in planning for court administration and case
management.
14. See generally Thom, supra note 5. See also infra Section VI.
15. See infra Section VI.
16. Although, as will be discussed in Section Il.D, Kazakhstan compiled statistics on how
many cases were reconciled as part of its general statistics of criminal cases filed and convictions.
Uzbekistan also publicizes some limited statistics regarding the use of reconciliation. See infra
Section VI.
17. See generally, Thorn, supra note 5. See also infra Section VI..
18. The November 2004 Conference and the OSCE/ODIHR Study indicate a common
perception among criminal justice professionals that reconciliation is a good way to handle cases.
See infra notes 20, 27. In Kazakhstan, this shift in thinking seems to be part of an overall shift
following the process of "humanization" of laws, with accompanying decreases in prison
populations and increased use of alternative sentencing. See infra note 155. As Kazakhstan is the
only country with statistics showing a clear increase in the number of cases reconciled, it seems that
this favorable view of reconciliation contributes to the result of more cases going to reconciliation.
See infra Section IV.
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OSCE/ODIHR staff prior to and following the conference of legal
professionals regarding the use and practice of reconciliation; and (4)
statistics provided by the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan in response to
requests from the OSCE/ODIHR in 2004 and in 2006. What follows is not
intended to be an exhaustive explanation of the reconciliation process, but an
overview of the author's understanding of reconciliation practices in four
Central Asian countries based on the available information. This article may
encourage further study of current practices.
A. Central Asian Constitutions and Laws Governing Reconciliation
The English-speaking researcher has fairly easy access to the
constitutions of all four countries.' 9 The Criminal Code and Criminal
Procedure Codes are available for each country, although not always online
and not always in English. The author arranged translations into English of
relevant provisions of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Codes of
each country. This article discusses these sources of law in greater detail in
Section VI below.
B. 2004 Central Asian Conference on Alternatives to Criminal Prosecution
The OSCE/ODIHR organized a Central Asian conference on
Alternatives to Criminal Prosecution in Central Asia in November 2004.0
19. KAz. CONST. available at http://www.kazakhstanembassy.org.uk/cgi-bin/index/225; TAJ.
CONST., available at http://unpan I .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan03670.htm;
UZB. CONST., available at http://www.uzbekconsul.org/uzbekistan/constitution.pdf; KYRG. CONST.,
available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal-Affairs/Legal-co-operation/Foreigners-and-citizens/
Nationality/Documents/National-legislation/Kyrgyzstan%20Constitution%2Of/o2Othe%2OKyrghyz
%20Republic.asp. Kyrgyzstan adopted a new constitution by referendum on October 21, 2007. The
new constitution was not yet available in English on the intemet at the time this article went to press.
The Russian language version of the new constitution is on file with the author. In the past
translation issues caused delays in publishing new versions of the constitution, see Abdumomum
Mamaraimov, Text of the New Kyrgyz Constitution is not Published Because of Translation
Problems, Ferghana.ru Information Agency, Nov. 24, 2006, available at http://enews.ferghana.ru/
article.php?id+ 1712 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
20. The full conference title was: Alternatives to Criminal Prosecution and Protection of
Human Rights in Central Asia. The Conference was co-organized by the Supreme Court of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), and the OSCE Centre in
Almaty. The conference was held on November 25-26, 2004 in Almaty, Kazakhstan and was
possible due to funding provided by the government of the United Kingdom [hereinafter Nov. 2004
Conference].
Judges, prosecutors, police officers, and lawyers from all four Central Asian
countries attended the conference. 2' The conference organizers hoped it
would: (1) expand the discussion surrounding the use of reconciliation in
Central Asia and (2) encourage greater restraint in expanding the use of
reconciliation while local and international legal communities consider more
fully the implications of using reconciliation. The OSCE/ODIHR planned
the conference after identifying reconciliation as a change in criminal law
adopted in each of the four countries without sufficient scrutiny or policy
debate internally or from the international community.
23
The conference began with presentations from representatives regarding
recent developments in reconciliation in their respective countries.24
Experts from Poland, Austria, and Russia discussed current restorative
justice practices in their countries.25 Conference presenters also discussed
current international standards, including the United Nations Basic
Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters
and Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (99) 19 of the Committee of
Ministers to the Member States Concerning Mediation in Penal Matters.26
C. Informal Interviews of Central Asian Legal Professionals
In preparation for this conference, the OSCE/ODIHR commissioned a
study in the summer of 2004 on restorative justice in Central Asia.2 7 The
21. OSCE Press Release, OSCE/ODIHR Conference Discusses Alternative to Criminal
Prosecution in Central Asia (Nov. 24, 2004), available at http://www.osce.org/item/
8760.html?print= I (last visited Oct. 30, 2007); List of Participants (on file with author).
22. In the author's previous capacity she supervised the organization of the November 2004
Conference. These goals were not written or recorded anywhere.
23. Press Release, supra note 21.
24. Agenda, Conference on Alternatives to Criminal Prosecution and the Protection of Human
Rights in Central Asia (on file with the OSCE/ODIHR, Warsaw, Poland).
25. Id.
26. Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters, UN
ECOSOC REs. 2000/14, U.N. Doc. E/2000/1NF/2/Add.2 at 35 (2000), available at
http://www.library.dal.ca/law/Guides/RestPathfinder/RestorativeDeclarationpdf.pdf;
Recommendation No. R (99) 19 of the Committee of the Ministers to Member States Concerning
Mediation in Penal Matters (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers Sept. 15, 1999), 679th Meeting
of the Ministers' Deputies, available at http://www.legislationonline.org/legislation.php?tid=
155&lid=5008&less=false.
27. Thom, supra note 5. This study was not, by any means, a comprehensive survey.
However, Mr. Thom's information gathering and analysis of current reconciliation practices in
Central Asia showed they do not fit even a loose definition of restorative justice. At the time the
study was commissioned in the summer of 2004, it was less clear how inapplicable this term was in
connection with practices in Central Asia. See infra Section V of this article for additional
information about restorative justice, and see Sections VI and VII on why it is not an applicable term
in the context of current developments in Central Asia.
[Vol. 8: 1, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
OSCE/ODIHR understood that the study would not result in a
comprehensive survey but intended it to provide background information in
advance of the November 2004 Conference for the participants themselves
and to aid in identifying the most relevant topics for the conference. 28 The
study relied on reviewing the existing laws and on a series of interviews with
legal professionals in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 29  This information
appeared in a report and after the November 2004 Conference, the author
and other OSCE/ODIHR staff members continued discussions with legal
professionals about current reconciliation practices. 30 The author does not
intend to imply that this informal informational gathering process conformed
to empirical research standards.
D. Statistics
The OSCE/ODIHR requested that each country Vrovide statistics at the
2004 Conference on the number of cases reconciled. 1 Only the Prosecutor
General's Office of Kazakhstan came to the conference with statistics.32
These statistics showed the number of criminal cases filed in the country and
the number of cases reconciled.33  In 2006, following a subsequent
OSCE/ODIHR request, the Prosecutor General's Office of Kazakhstan again
provided statistics. 34 The 2006 numbers differed from the earlier numbers.
35
However, both sets of statistics showed the increasing use of reconciliation
in the country.36 The discrepancies between the two sets of statistics point
28. This was not written or recorded anywhere but was the reason the author, in her previous
capacity, requested Mr. Thorn conduct the study.
29. Thorn, supra note 5.
30. Due to the highly informal nature of these interviews over a two-year period, which should
be more accurately termed "discussions," there are no written records and instead the author is left
with a series of impressions.
3 1. The OSCE/ODIHR made these requests both orally and in invitation letters as part of the
preparations for the conference. Interview with Mr. Dmitry Nurumov, Rule of Law Coordinator in
Central Asia, OSCE/ODIHR in Grundy, Va. (June 30, 2006). Mr. Nurumov was responsible for
organizing both the substantive and administrative details of the November 2004 Conference.
32. Statistics on file with the author. See also infra Section VI.D.
33. Statistics on file with the author. See also infra Section VI.D.
34. Statistics on file with the author. See also infra Section VI.D.
35. Statistics on file with the author. See also infra Section VI.D.
36. In Kazakhstan the figures have increased. In 2001 a total of 4615 cases registered closed
due to reconciliation. In 2002 the figure was 6105. In 2003 the figure was 15,570. In 2004 figures
for the first nine months show a total of 12,853 cases closed due to reconciliation. These figures
were provided by the Prosecutor General's Office in Kazakhstan in preparation for the November
49
to the difficulty in obtaining accurate information in Central Asia, even
when the appropriate government agency provides the information.37 Again
in 2006, the OSCE/ODIHR requested the Prosecutor General's Office in
Kyrgyzstan to provide statistics, which it has not provided. 38  The
OSCE/ODIHR also requested human rights organizations and academics to
find statistics for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.3 9 These requests also produced
nothing.4 °
IV. BACKGROUND ON CENTRAL ASIA
The Soviet Union once included all four countries analyzed in this
article. All gained their independence at the same time. 41  Each country
shares the Soviet history, as well as regional and cultural similarities.
42
Central Asian criminal justice systems reflect this common history and
current practices still vary little from the Soviet models each country
inherited at independence. This section will begin with background on each
country and then move to a description of how the criminal justice systems
work.
2004 Conference and are on file with the author. See infra Section VI.D, noting that the statistics
provided in 2006 were different in raw data but also reported an increase in numbers of cases going
to reconciliation.
37. The differences in numbers could be due to one or more reasons including poor skills in
gathering statistics, poor record keeping at the entry levels, or due to a decision to alter the statistics
for political reasons. At this point there is insufficient information to draw any conclusion as to why
the difference exists.
38. Interview with Dmitry Nurumov, supra note 31.
39. Due to the political situation in Uzbekistan, the OSCE decided not to request these
numbers directly from the government. See supra note 9. See also infra Section IV. The
OSCE/ODIHR did not request statistics directly from the government in Tajikistan due to previous
experiences of government institutions not responding to requests for information. Interview with
Dmitry Nurumov, supra note 31.
40. Interview with Dmitry Nurumov, supra note 31.
41. See, e.g., Archie Brown, Reform, Coup and Collapse: The End of the Soviet State,
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/soviet end-ol .shtml (last visited Oct.
31, 2007). See generally, OLIVIER ROY, THE NEW CENTRAL ASIA: THE CREATION OF NATIONS
(2000) (describing the common history, common experiences under the Soviet Union and
independence of the Central Asian states).
42. See, e.g., ROY, supra note 41; MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, CENTRAL ASIA'S SECOND
CHANCE (2005).
50
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A. Kazakhstan
Of the four countries, Kazakhstan possesses the potentially strongest
economy due to its large oil deposits.43 Kazakhstan is nearly four times the
size of the state of Texas, making it the largest country in Central Asia in
terms of land mass.44 Kazakhstan's population is over fifteen million
people. 5 Sixty-eight percent of its population falls in the 15-64 age range.46
Despite its strong natural resource base, nineteen percent of Kazakhstan's
population lives under the poverty line. 7
Kazakhstan came under Russian rule in the 18th century and became a
Republic of the Soviet Union in 1936.48 People tend to consider Kazakhstan
the most "Russified" of the former Soviet states in Central Asia.49 President
Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president at the time of independence from the
Soviet Union in 1991, leads the country.' President Nazarbayev held a
place in the Soviet elite prior to Kazakhstan's independence.5  His
presidency is marked by corruption, human rights violations, and repeated
elections that fail to meet international standards. 2 In the last election,
President Nazarbayev "won" 91.15 percent of the vote. 3  As an
authoritarian leader, President Nazarbayev provides little space for
43. See Ilan Greenberg, Up, Up and Away: New Towers, and Ambitions to Match, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2006, at A4 (describing the thriving economy in Kazakhstan and the impact in Almaty).
See also CIA, The World Factbook, Kazakhstan, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/kz.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2007) for basic statistic regarding Kazakhstan's
economy.





49. Dave Bhavna, Minorities and Participation in Public Life: Kazakhstan, UNITED NATIONS
OFF. OF THE COMMISIONER FOR HUM. RTS., Oct. 2004, http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/
minorities/docsfWP5.doe.
50. See generally MARTHA BRILL OLCOTr, KAZAKHSTAN: UNFULFILLED PROMISE (2002)
(giving a modern political history of Kazakhstan including analysis of the history of President
Nazarbayev's rise to power and why he successfully retains it).
51. Id.at24-30.
52. See, e.g., Republic of Kazakhstan Presidential Election 4 Dec. 2005 (OSCE/ODIHR
Election Observation Mission Final Report) (February 21, 2006) available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/ 2006/02/18133_en.pdf; U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2005, KAZAKHSTAN, available at http://www/state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/_2005/61656.htm (last visited June 15, 2006).
53. See Republic of Kazakhstan Presidential Election, supra note 52, at 33.
opposition political activities or the development of civil society.54 In 1997,
President Nazarbayev moved the capital from Almaty to Astana 5  This
move entailed substantial government spending to transform Astana from a
sleepy provincial town into a capital.
5 6
The country's legislature passes laws, but in practice the executive uses
the legislative branch as a tool, effectively preventing the legislature from
exercising independent lawmaking powers.5 7 The judicial branch is also far
from independent.58
B. Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan's significantly smaller land mass does not share
Kazakhstan's vast oil resources.5 9 The smallest population of the four
countries lives in a landlocked mountainous country, with over sixty-two
percent of its five million inhabitants falling in the 15-64 age range. 60 Forty
percent of its population lives below the poverty line.6' Some estimate that
approximately half a million citizens of Kyrgyzstan live abroad as labor
migrants due to the levels of poverty at home.62
Kyrgyzstan was annexed by Russia in 1864, and joined the Soviet
Union in 1924.63 It gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. 4
54. Freedom House gives Kazakhstan a score of "6" in terms of political rights ("7" is the
lowest possible score indicating the lowest level of political rights) and a score of "5" in terms of
civil liberties. FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (Kazakhstan), http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfmn?page=22&year- 2005&country=6764 (last visited on June 25, 2006).
55. See, e.g., Steven Lee Meyers, Kazakhstan 's Futuristic Capital, Complete With Pyramid,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006, at A4; Embassy of Kazakhstan to the USA and Canada, Astana: The
New Capital of Kazakhstan, http://www.kazakhembus.com/Astana.htm (last visited October 31,
2007).
56. Meyers, supra note 55, at A4.
57. See, e.g., OLCOTT, supra note 50, at 87-127 (discussing President Nazarbayev's
consolidation of power). A recent example of Presidential influence over the Parliament occurred in
May, 2007, when the Parliament voted to exempt President Nazarbayev from the two-term limit in
the Kazakhstan Constitution. C.J. Chivers, Kazakhstan: President Voted in For Life, if He Likes,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2007, at A4.
58. See CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW INITIATIVE, JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR
KAZAKHSTAN, 10 (American Bar Association Feb. 2004) available at http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/
publications/jri/jri_ kazakhstan.pdf.
59. CIA, The World Factbook, Kyrgyzstan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/kg.html (last visited October 31, 2007).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Central Asia: Special Report on
Labour Migrants in Russia (Mar. 17, 2004), IR1NNews.org, http://www.irinnews.org/
report.asp?ReportlD= 40107&SelectRegion=CentralAsia&SelectCountry=CENTRALASIA.
63. CIA, Kyrgyzstan, supra note 59.
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Kyrgyzstan also had a long-standing president, Askar Akayev, who came
from the Soviet elite.6 5 After contested parliamentary elections in February
2005, demonstrations began in the south of the country and moved to the
capital of Bishkek.66 Following violent demonstrations in Bishkek and the
capture of the Presidential Palace by the demonstrators, President Akayev
fled to Russia in March 2005.67
The country suffers from political instability that lingers after the
elections in July 2005 and November 2005.68 Unlike Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyzstan president does not exercise strong authoritarian leadership.69
However, prosecutors and law enforcement officials exercise
disproportionate power.70 The current president, Kurmanbek Bakiev, "won"
89 percent of the vote in the last election. 7I The highly chaotic legislature
exercises weak power.72 The judiciary is not independent.74
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., BBC News, Profile Askar Akayev, Apr. 4, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4371819.stm.
66. See, e.g., BBC News, Kyrgyzstan 's Friendly Revolution, Mar. 26, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from-our_owncorrespondent/4384499.stm.
67. See, e.g., BBC News, Akayev Quits as Kygyz President, Apr. 4, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/asia-pacific/4403591 .stm.
68. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2005 (Mar. 8,
2006), http://www.state.gove/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61657.htm. The U.S. State Department noted a
"considerable improvement" in the government's respect for human rights following the overthrow
of the Akayev regime. Id.
69. Interview with Dmitry Nurumov, supra note 31. This was still true in the middle of 2006.
However, indications were that President Kurmanbek Bakiev was moving to consolidate his power
as the overall political environment in Kyrgyzstan stabilized. Id. For a more optimistic view of the
revolution see Tom Wood, Reflections on the Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, 30 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD
AFF. 43 (2006). In October 2007, a referendum approved a new constitution giving greater power to
the President. See supra note 19; see also David L. Stern, Kyrgyzstan Parliament Dissolved; Fraud
Seen in Constitution Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at A5; Bruce Pannier, Kyrgyzstan: Does New
Constitution Strengthen Democracy--or President Bakiev? RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Oct.
22, 2007, available at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/ 10/01e577bc-95fl-44a4-b816-
b8el 6a48511 b.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
70. See, e.g., CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW INITIATIVE, PROSECUTORIAL REFORM
INDEX FOR KYRGYZSTAN, 4-5 (American Bar Association 2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/rol/ publications/kyrgyzstan-pri-10-2007.pdf; International Crisis Group,
Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform, ASIA REPORT NO.42, Dec. 10, 2002, at 7-11 available
at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/ index.cfm?id= 1444&1=l.
71. BBC News, Bakiev sworn in as Kyrgyz leader, Aug. 14, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4150084.stm.
72. Bruce Pannier, Kyrgyzstan: Resignation Triggers Political Showdown, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/08F05824-4198-4A18-AFD8-
732D77D0467A.html (last visited June 29, 2006). The Parliament, the Zhogorky Kenesh, following
C. Tajikistan
Tajikistan is also a smaller landlocked mountainous country with few
natural resources. 74  Over fifty-seven percent of Tajikistan's population of
seven million are between the ages of fifteen to sixty-four.75  Over thirty-
seven percent of Tajikistan's population is fourteen years old or younger.
7 6
Sixty-four percent of the population lives below the poverty line." Some
estimate that over 600,000 citizens of Tajikistan work as labor migrants in
Russia. 7
Russia ruled Tajikistan in the 1860s and 1870s and the Soviet Union
claimed it in 1925. 79 Shortly after gaining independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991, a civil war broke out lasting from 1992-1997.80  The war
killed between 60,000-100,000 people and displaced a tenth of the
population." The Islamic opposition and the government reached a peace
agreement in 1997, but Tajikistan continues to suffer the political and
economic consequences of the war.82 Elections in 1994 brought the current
authoritarian president, Emomali Rahmonov, to power.8 3  During the last
the events of February-March 2005 did gain power and exercised some independence in 2005. Id.
However, in early 2006 the Speaker of the Parliament, Omurbek Tekebaev, resigned after calling
President Bakiev a "dog." Id. Takebaev's resignation marked the beginning of the decline of the
Parliament's new found independence. Id.
73. CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW INITIATIVE, JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR
KYRGYZSTAN 9 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/publications/jri/jri kyrgyzstan.pdf;
see also The Special-Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges
and Lawyers 2, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/52/Add.3 (Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Mission to
Kyrgyzstan].
74. CIA, The World Factbook, Tajikistan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-




78. UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Central Asia: Special Report on
Labour Migrants in Russia, IRINNews.org, Mar. 17, 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?
ReportlD= 40107&SelectRegion=CentralAsia&SelectCountry=CENTRALASIA. This does not
include the numbers who may have migrated to countries other than Russia in search of jobs. Id.
See also Ilan Greenberg, Central Asians Chase Jobs, and Endure Exploitation, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 2007, at A4.
79. CIA, Tajikistan, supra note 74.
80. International Crisis Group, Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace, ASIA REPORT No. 30, at 7
(2001), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/ A400521_
24122001.pdf.
81. Id.
82. Id. The war devastated the country economically. Tajikistan was one of the poorest
republics in the USSR and had the lowest per capita GDP and highest population growth. See id.
83. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2005,
Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61679.htm.
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election, he "won" ninety-seven percent of the vote. The chaotic legislature
exercises no independent power. The judiciary is also not independent.8 5
Tajikistan shares a 1,300 kilometer boarder with Afghanistan. 86  The
continuing problems in Afghanistan contribute to instability in Tajikistan,
particularly in on-going trafficking of guns, drugs, and people.87
D. Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan's twenty-seven million citizens live in a landlocked country
a little larger than California, making it the largest country in Central Asia in
terms of population.88  Uzbekistan shares with Tajikistan a relatively
younger population, with 32.9 percent being fourteen years or younger. 89
Twenty-eight percent of the population of Uzbekistan lives below the
poverty line. 90 Uzbekistan supplied a significant amount of cotton to the
former Soviet Union by overusing agrochemicals and irrigation.9' Those
practices poisoned its land and contributed to the shrinking of the Aral Sea
and many rivers.9 2
Uzbekistan fell under Russian rule in the late 19th century and became
part of the Soviet Union in 1924. 93  Like Kazakhstan, one president,
President Islam Karimov, led Uzbekistan since its independence from the
84. Id. The OSCE/ODIHR made repeated efforts in 2004-2005 to get the draft amendments to
the Code of Criminal Procedure reviewed. These efforts were unsuccessful due to difficulty in
identifying the most recent drafts and the stage of the legislative process. This lack of success
seemed to be due to disorganization within the government, including the Parliament, and not to a
decision or policy to not give this information to international organizations. Interview with Dmitry
Nurumov, supra note 3 1.
85. The Special-Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges
and Lawyers 2, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/52/Add.4 (Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Mission to
Tajikistan].
86. CIA, Tajikistan, supra note 74.
87. Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace, supra note 80.
88. CIA, The World Factbook, Uzbekistan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/uz.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). Uzbekistan is one of only two double
landlocked countries in the world (Liechtenstein is the other). Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. International Crisis Group, The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia's Destructive Monoculture,
ASIA REPORT NO. 93, 28-30 (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/
library/documents/asia/central asia/093_curseof_cottoncentral asiadestructivemonoculture.pdf.
92. The Curse of Cotton, supra note 91. See also CIA, Uzbekistan, supra note 88.
93. CIA, Uzbekistan, supra note 88.
Soviet Union in 1991.94 President Karimov, an entrenched member of the
Soviet elite, rose to power in 1990, prior to Uzbekistan's independence..95
In the last presidential election, President Karimov "won" 91.9 percent of
the vote. 96  As an authoritarian leader, President Karimov rules over a
country with serious human rights violations and he keeps an almost
pathological grip on all aspects of Uzbekistan society. 97 The legislature does
not operate independently from the executive. 98  The judiciary is not
independent. 99
After September 11, 2001, Uzbekistan started to justify its repressive
tactics against perceived Islamic militants under the guise of "fighting
terrorism."' 00  Until the end of 2005, an airbase in Uzbekistan partly
supplied and supported the United States' operations in Afghanistan.' 0'
In the spring of 2005, the government of Uzbekistan ended a
demonstration in the southern city of Andijon by firing into a crowd and
killing well over a hundred unarmed civilians. 10 2  The demonstration
followed the trial of twenty-three local businessmen accused of "Islamic
extremism" and acts against the state. 0 3 Many people in the businessmen's
94. BBC News, Country Profile: Uzbekistan, Aug. 29, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/country-profiles/1238242.stm#leaders (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
95. The Supreme Soviet, the Soviet parliament, elected Karimov to the position of president in
1990. Id. See also CIA, Uzbekistan, supra note 88.
96. BBC News, Uzbekistan, supra note 94.
97. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Human Rights, Mission to Uzbekistan, 11 U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2 (Feb. 3, 2003). The UN Special Rapporteur reported that torture is
"systematic" in Uzbekistan, meaning that if a person is arrested he or she is likely to be tortured. Id.
98. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS COUNTRY STUDIES, Country Profile: Uzbekistan 12-13, available
at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Uzbekistan.pdf (Feb. 2007) (last visited November 2, 2007).
99. See generally, CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW INSTITUTE, JUDICIAL REFORM
INDEX FOR UZBEKISTAN 10 (American Bar Association 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/
ceeli/ publications/jri/jri-uzbekistan.pdf.
100. See generally, Martha Brill Olcott, War on Terrorism in Central Asia and the Cause of
Democratic Reform, 11 DEMOCRATIZATSIYA: J. POST-SOVIET DEM 1 (2003), available at
http://www.demokratizatsiya. orglhtml.voll I .html; Saule Mukhametrakhimova, Dealing With Hizb-
ut-Tahrir, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=321670
&apc-state =henprca (last visited June 30, 2006).
101. Robin Wright & Ann Scott Tyson, U.S. Evicted From Air Base In Uzbekistan, WASH.
POST, July 30, 2005 at A01. After the United States' position following the events at Andijon the
government of Uzbekistan ordered the base closed. Id.
102. The government acknowledged 169 people were killed. Non-governmental estimates
placed the numbers at seven hundred to over a thousand people killed. See, e.g., Uzbekistan: the
Andijon Uprising, supra note 9. The following account of the events in Andijon is pulled from
several sources including the OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring report, supra note 9, and Uzbekistan:
the Andijon Uprising, supra note 9, at 1.
103. Uzbekistan: the Andijon Uprising, supra note 9, at 1; OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring
Report, supra note 9, at 5-6; and BBC News, How the Andijon Killings Unfolded, May 17, 2005,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4550845.stm.
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community, however, viewed these men as local leaders engaged in
charitable work, rather than Islamic extremists.'°4 During the trial, people
staged peaceful daily protests outside the court room. 1 05 The demonstrations
grew each week that the trial continued. 106 As the demonstrations grew, so
did tensions that exploded after the trial ended, but before the court
announced the verdicts. 07 People feared that the court would convict all the
men.' 08 An armed crowd broke into the Andijon prison freeing up to five
hundred prisoners.' °9 The next day, a demonstration began in the town
square lasting for nearly a day before security forces fired into the unarmed
crowd of civilians. "10 Some refugees fled to Kyrgyzstan. 111
After the events in Andijon the human rights situation deteriorated
significantly in Uzbekistan. The government arrested hundreds (perhaps
thousands) of people and put many on trial, all of whom the courts convicted
and sentenced to time in prison." 2 The courts did not put on trial a single
member of the security forces or the government for the events in Andijon,
and Uzbekistan consistently refused to act on requests by the international
community to have an independent investigation into the events. 13
104. Uzbekistan: the Andijon Uprising, supra note 9, at 2-3; OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring
Report supra note 9, at 5-6.
105. Uzbekistan: the Andijon Uprising, supra note 9, at 2-3; OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring
Report supra note 9, at 5-6; and BBC News, How the Andijon Killings Unfolded, supra note 103.
106. Uzbekistan: the Andijon Uprising, supra note 9, at 2-3; OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring
Report supra note 9, at 5-6; and BBC News, How the Andijon Killings Unfolded, supra note 103.
107. Uzbekistan: the Andijon Uprising, supra note 9, at 2-3; OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring
Report supra note 9, at 5-6; and BBC News, How the Andijon Killings Unfolded, supra note 103.
108. Uzbekistan: the Andyon Uprising, supra note 9, at 2-3; OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring
Report supra note 9, at 5-6; and BBC News, How the Andijon Killings Unfolded, supra note 103.
109. Uzbekistan: the Andijon Uprising, supra note 9, at 2-3; OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring
Report supra note 9, at 5-6; and BBC News, How the Andijon Killings Unfolded, supra note 103.
110. Uzbekistan: the Andijon Uprising, supra note 9, at 2-3; OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring
Report supra note 9, at 5-6; and BBC News, How the Andijon Killings Unfolded, supra note 103.
111. Uzbekistan: the Andijon Uprising, supra note 9, at 2-3; OSCE/OD1HR Trial Monitoring
Report supra note 9, at 5-6; and BBC News, How the Andijon Killings Unfolded, supra note 103.
112. Due to the lack of adherence to even minimal fair trial standards the author hesitates to call
these proceedings "trials." See Report from the OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring in Uzbekistan,
supra note 9. See also, Gafurjan Yuldashev, Andijan Activist Arrested as Uzbek Purge Continues,
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, June 23, 2006, available at http://www.iwpr.net/
?p=rca&s=f&o=321786&apcstate = henprca (last visited July 1, 2006). For an account of the
increased repression by the Uzbekistan government, see, e.g., Uzbekistan: Stop Arresting Defenders
for Reporting on Andijan Massacre, Human Rights First, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
defenders/hrduzbekistan/alert06OI05_andijan.htm (last visited on Feb. 24, 2007).
113. See Uzbekistan, the Andijon Uprising, supra note 9.
E. Corruption
Corruption poses a serious problem throughout Central Asia.
Corruption goes beyond an occasional need to pay a bribe and is woven into
the fabric of society in each of the four countries.1 14 No institution, part of
government, or individual citizen escapes its impact. Corruption affects all
areas of life in each of the four countries, including higher education, health
care, and the legal system. 5 People expect payments of money for a range
of services.116 The average citizen in any of these four countries does not
believe that the legal system operates based on "justice" or "fairness," but
rather sees the system operating based on power, influence, and payments. 11
7
Therefore, the average citizen of Central Asia views corruption as perhaps
the single most effective dispute resolution tool at his or her disposal,
assuming the average citizen has the resources to make the pay-offs. "18
Transparency International publishes a Corruption Perceptions Index
every year. 1 9 Under this rating system, a score of ten indicates a "highly
114. See, e.g., Gerald Staberock, A Rule of Law Agenda for Central Asia, 2 ESSEx HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 1, 12 (2004). See also infra notes 116-120.
115. See generally International Crisis Group, Central Asia, supra note 70 (describing serious
levels of police corruption in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). See also LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS COUNTRY STUDIES, Country Profile: Uzbekistan, Health, §§ 5-8, and Internal Security,
§§ 3-8, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ uztoc.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2007); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
COUNTRY STUDIES, Country Profile: Tajikistan, Internal Security, § I (described as "poor due to
civil war and pervasive corruption") at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/tjtoc.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2007).
116. This includes pay-offs to get health care, jobs and grades. "All businesses pay the security
forces, the procuracy and the tax police, in one way or another." International Crisis Group, Central
Asia, supra note 70, at 9 (describing Kyrgyzstan). Police are routinely required to pay to get
promotions into jobs that are more lucrative due to the expected bribes. International Crisis Group,
Central Asia, supra note 70, at 8-10, 24-26 (describing Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan); LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS COUNTRY STUDIES, Country Profile: Uzbekistan, Health, § 5-8, supra note 115.
117. For the results of a survey on attitudes towards corruption in Kazakhstan, see Philip M.
Nichols, The Fit Between Changes to the International Corruption Regime and Indigenous
Perceptions of Corruption in Kazakhstan, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 863, 915-45 (2001).
118. See, e.g., Zamira Eshanova, Central Asia: Corruption a Common Feature of Every-Day
Life, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO FREE LIBERTY, (July 17, 2002), http://www.rferl.org/features/
2002/07/
17072002162933.asp; Roger Kangas, Legal Reform in Central Asia: Battling the Influence of
History, in IN THE TRACKS OF TAMERLANE: CENTRAL ASIA'S PATH TO THE 21ST CENTURY 65, 82
(Daniel L. Burghart & Theresa Sabonis-Helf eds., 2005), available at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/
tamerlane.htm (stating that corruption undermines confidence in the legal system leading people to
alternative forms ofjustice).
119. Corruptions Perceptions Index 2007, http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/
surveysjindices/cpi/2007 (last viewed Oct. 31, 2007).
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clean" country and a score of zero indicates a "highly corrupt" country. 120
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan earned a rating of 2.1.121 Uzbekistan
scored 1.7.122 These scores placed all four countries firmly in the bottom of
the list of all countries and indicate high levels of corruption. 1
2 3
F. How do the Criminal Justice Systems Work in Central Asia?
The average person charged with a crime in Central Asia enters a world
where rights are not respected, where confessions are expected, and where
conviction is inevitable in the absence of adequate money or connections to
secure release from both prison and further criminal prosecution. 124  The
day-to-day practices in the criminal justice systems of Central Asia have
changed little since the time when the Soviets ruled. The rights of the state
still stand supreme over the rights of the individual. 125  Criminal procedure
120. Denmark, Finland and New Zealand earned the top scores of 9.4 in 2007. Myanmar and




124. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers the
conviction rate in criminal cases in Kazakhstan is ninety-nine percent. The Special-Rapporteur,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers 15, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.2 (Jan. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Mission to Kazakhstan]. The statistics provided
by the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan to the OSCE/ODIHR also give a conviction rate of ninety-
nine percent in both 2005 and 2004 (statistics on file with author). The UN Special Rapporteur on
the Question of Torture concluded there is widespread corruption and lack of respect for the
presumption of innocence in the criminal justice system in Uzbekistan. Mission to Uzbekistan,
supra note 97, at 20. Trial monitoring in Central Asia by international organizations tends to focus
on high profile cases such as the report on the trials after the Andijon events. See, e.g., Report from
the OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring in Uzbekistan, supra note 9. One exception was a project by the
OSCE/ODIHR in 2005-2006 monitoring trials in Kazakhstan. The monitors observed 730 court
hearings and noted judges regularly failed to follow the law in routine criminal cases.
OSCE/ODIHR, Results of Trial Monitoring in the Republic of Kazakhstan (2006), available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/cia/2007/02/2341 l-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
125. For a summary of executive use of power at the expense of individual human rights see
Michael Ochs, Human Rights in Central Asia, in IN THE TRACKS OF TAMERLANE, supra note 118, at
93. For general reports on human rights in each country see Human Rights Watch,
http://www.hrw.org/doc/?t--europe; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2007: THE STATE OF THE
WORLD'S HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www. amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/index.html; U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, available at http://www.state.gov/g/dr/rls/
hrrpt/.
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developed in the Soviet Union to meet the needs of the state. 2 6 Balancing
the rights of the defendant with the rights of the state was absent in the
formation of the procedure (although arguably not absent in rhetoric).
127
The concept that the rights of the state are supreme and that individual rights
are not a priority remains a fundamental basis on which the criminal justice
systems of each of the four Central Asian states is developing.'2 8 Reform,
such as it has happened, has not been underpinned by increasing individual
rights. 129 Different institutions competing for power, position, and influence
drive reform within each country.13 °  The strongest proponents for
defendants' rights in western societies - such as defense attorneys or non-
governmental organizations - have little voice in Central Asia and often lack
awareness themselves of the possible mechanisms or reforms to protect
individual rights, thus limiting the scope of their advocacy.' 1
126. For general information about the criminal justice system under the Soviet Union, see, e.g.,
PETER H. SOLOMON JR., SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER STALIN (1996), and REFORMING
JUSTICE IN RUSSIA 1864-1996: POWER, CULTURE, AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER (Peter H.
Solomon, Jr. ed., 1997).
127. See, e.g., REFORMING JUSTICE IN RUSSIA, supra note 126.
128. See generally Gerald Staberock, supra note 114, (discussing Central Asian legal systems
continuing Soviet legacy and failure to develop strong protections for individual rights). For a
general discussion of legal reform in Central Asia, see Roger Kangas, supra note 118.
129. See Gerald Staberock, supra note 114. See generally supra note 125 (for more detailed
information on current human rights practices in each state showing the regular violation of
individual human rights in each of the four Central Asian countries discussed in this article).
130. One example of such reform accompanied by shifts in power is when Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan transferred the administration of prisons from the Ministry of Interior to
the Ministry of Justice. See, e.g., Penal Reform International, Central Asia, http://
www.penalreform.org/central-asia-2 html. Transfer of the power to sanction arrest from the
prosecutors to the judiciary (habeas corpus) represents a difficult and far ranging change and such a
shift in power thus far has not occurred in any of the four countries. See, e.g., CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE [C. CRIM. P.] art. 150 (Kaz.); CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [C. CRIM. P.] art. 243
(Uzb.); infra notes 155, 156.
131. This is a direct result of the lack of democratic development in each of the four countries.
The governmental approach toward civil society development in each country can, at best, be
described as not supportive. However, it is probably more accurately described in most, if not all
four countries, as repressive and punitive. There are regular reports of NGOs being harassed,
particularly if the NGO is viewed as a political "opposition" group. See, e.g., Michael Ochs, supra
note 125. This harassment can include imprisonment and torture, as well as the "lighter" approach
of tax inspections. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES 2006, Uzbekistan, Freedom of Association, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/
78848.htm. Freedom House gave all four countries a cumulative rating of "not free" with political
rights rating at a low of "7" (with one being the highest, and seven the lowest) for Uzbekistan.
Freedom House, Map of Freedom in the World 2005, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?
page=363&year=2005 (last visited Sept. 25, 2007). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all rate a
"6" for political rights. Id. For an interesting analysis of NGO attitudes and development in
Kyrgyzstan see Kelly M. McMann, The Civil Realm in Kyrgyzstan: Soviet Economic Legacies and
Activists Expectations, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, supra note 4, at 213-245.
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The prosecutor is still all-powerful. 3 2 Judicial independence is still at
best an aspiration, not a reality. 3 3  Defense attorneys cannot provide an
active defense. 134 This limited role, when combined with high levels of
institutional corruption, frequently turns defense attorneys into agents who
facilitate resolution of a case by making pay-offs on behalf of the client to
investigators, prosecutors, and judges.'35 The legal profession in all four
countries operates without any ethical framework, as ethics codes are
virtually non-existent and, where they do exist, are extremely weak and not
regularly enforced. 1
3 6
1. Basic Criminal Procedure
All four countries have similar criminal procedure rules derived from
the Soviet Criminal Procedure Code. 13' The legislatures have amended the
laws so that most systems, at least in name, have made the transition from
inquisitorial to adversarial models. 13' After the police make an arrest, they
132. See, e.g., Mission to Tajikistan, supra note 85 (noting that the disproportionate power of
the prosecutor prevents the development of a effective and independent judiciary); Mission to
Kyrgyzstan, supra note 73 (noting the powers of the prosecution are a "special feature [that] can be
observed throughout the whole of Central Asia and other CIS countries, and reflects the Soviet
system of Prokuratura.").
133. For general information about the state of judicial reform in Central Asia see JUDICIAL
REFORM INDEX FOR KAZAKHSTAN, supra note 58; JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR UZBEKISTAN,
supra note 99; JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR KYRGYZSTAN, supra note 73.
134. For an excellent history and analysis of the role of defense lawyers in Russia see generally
PAMELA A. JORDAN, DEFENDING RIGHTS IN RUSSIA: LAWYERS, THE STATE AND LEGAL REFORM IN
THE POST-SOVIET ERA 136-174 (2005) (describing the limited role of defense lawyers at various
stages of Russian history including a discussion of the post-Soviet era). The developments in each
of the four Central Asian countries discussed in this article are different from the arguably more
advanced developments in Russia. However, the historical foundations both in terms of law and
practice are the same.
135. See, e.g., Mission to Kazakhstan, supra note 124 at 13-14; American Bar Association
Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, Legal Profession Reform Indexfor Kyrgyzstan, Oct.
2004, available at https://www.abanet.org/ceeli/publications/lpri/lpri-kyrgyzstan.pdf.
136. See generally Judicial Reform Index for Kazakhstan, supra note 58; Judicial Reform Index
for Uzbekistan, supra note 99; Judicial Reform Index for Kyrgyzstan, supra note 74 and Legal
Profession Reform Index for Kyrgyzstan, supra note 135.
137. What follows is a highly simplified view of criminal procedure intended to help the reader
understand the basic process.
138. TAJ. CONST. art. 88; C. CRIM. P. (Uzb.), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-in/texis/vtxl
rsd/rsddocview.pdftbl=RSDLEGAL&id=440d57c04 (in Russian); C. CRIM. P. art. 18 (Kyrg.),
available at http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/f3/6d/Obe~d6ce0d3adab5eda342f99b
conduct the "investigative stage."' 3 9  Typically, this is the stage of the
process when the police routinely obtain or extract confessions from the
defendant. 140 All four criminal justice systems operate under the belief that
the evidence is incomplete without a statement from a defendant. 41 That
statement is usually a confession of guilt. 1
42
After the investigative stage, the case goes to court for trial. A single
judge or a panel of judges, depending on the seriousness of the case, tries
criminal cases. 143  The laws do not exclude hearsay evidence, and victims
often make the equivalent of "victim impact statements" during the trial,
rather than at sentencing or after the conviction.44 At the time the judge
reads the verdict, he or she also pronounces the sentence, except for the rare
instances when the court acquits the defendant. 145  The procedure does not
8b.htm (in Russian); C. CRIM. P. art. 23 (Kaz.), available at http://www.legislationline.org/upload/
legislations/cc/5b/cc3bfb7e9dcd5a29274eOd22a96d.htm (in Russian).
139. See C. CRIM. P. Ch. 24 (Kaz.),supra note 138; C. CRIM. P. Ch. 43 (Uzb),supra note 138.
140. Police officers are expected to "solve cases." Failure to "solve" a case can result in
reprimand, while success results in favorable evaluations, promotions and bonuses. Torture and ill
treatment to exert confessions are commonplace in this environment. See Mission to Kazakhstan,
supra note 124, at 14. See also, International Crisis Group, Central Asia, supra note 70, at 11 ("the
system of measuring success solely according to statistics on crime detection ensures that there is
intense pressure on police to solve crimes by any method.").
141. Statements by the defendant are commonly the main evidence in a case. For a discussion
of the widespread use of confessions and ill treatment and torture to get these statements see Mission
to Kazakhstan, supra note 124 at 14-15; Mission to Uzbekistan, supra note 97 at 13. See also Frank
Ledwidge & Lucas Oppenheim, Preventing Torture: Reality and Perceptions, 30 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 165 (2006).
142. See International Crisis Group, Central Asia, supra note 70 at 24 (describing how police
pressure to solve cases leads to brutality in extracting confessions). See also generally, Frank
Ledwidge & Lucas Oppenheim, Preventing Torture: Reality and Perceptions, 30 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 165 (2006) (discussing the pressure to solve cases as a reason law enforcement tortures
suspects for confessions).
143. In 2005 Kazakhstan passed a "jury trial law" which came into force in January 2007 (on
file with author). Under this law serious cases will be decided by nine lay-assessors sitting in joint
deliberation with a judge. It is too early to evaluate how this new system is operating. For an
analysis of the development and current state of the law regarding jury trials in Kazakhstan, see
Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication of Crimes in the Commonwealth of Independent States: An
Independent or Impartial Jury or a "Court of Nodders"? 11 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 123 at 136-149
(2006).
144. For extreme examples of this see generally, Report from the OSCE/ODIHR Trial
Monitoring in Uzbekistan, supra note 9. For an explanation of witness participation in Russian
criminal trials see Scott P. Boylan, Coffee From a Samovar: The Role of the Victim in the Criminal
Procedure of Russia and the Proposed Victims Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution,
4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 103 at 114-117 (1998).
145. See Shahriyor Khodjaev, Criminal Procedure Law, in LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF
UZBEKISTAN 305 (Ilias Bantekas ed., 2005).
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allow for a separate sentencing hearing.146 No country has a system of plea
bargaining. 147
Judges most often impose imprisonment as the sentence. 48 Judges do
not widely use alternative sentencing, even though the option exists in each
country to varying degrees. 149  In all four countries, a judge will likely
sentence a juvenile without family connections to prison if arrested for an
offense.' 50  Judges routinely sentence adult offenders to prison and,
oftentimes, to significant prison terms even if the defendant has committed a
relatively minor offense. ''
146. Id. ("There is no separate sentencing hearing. Before reaching judicial deliberation the
prosecution and defence are required to submit their suggestions on whether the crime actually took
place, whether the action or inaction constitutes a crime and under what provision in the Criminal
Code, whether the act was indeed committed by the defendant, whether the defendant is guilty of
this crime, whether there are any mitigating or aggravating circumstances and whether the
defendant should be punished.") (emphasis added).
147. Although Central Asian legal professionals discuss plea bargaining in the context of on-
going criminal procedure code reforms. See, e.g., Press Release, OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE's Human
Rights Office Facilitates Discussion on International Trends and Local Perspectives in Criminal
Justice in Central Asia (Aug. 7, 2006), at http://www.osce.org/item/20078.html.
148. In 2005 the reported prison population rates per 100,000 inhabitants in Kazakhstan was
364 (twentieth place in the world in terms of prison population), in Kyrgyzstan it was 296 (thirty-
sixth place), in Uzbekistan it was 184 (sixty-sixth place) and in Tajikistan it was 164 (seventy-
seventh place). International Centre for Prison Studies, http://www.prisonstudies.org (last visited
June 30, 2006). See also, Roy Walmsley, Global Incarceration and Prison Trends, 3 F. ON CRIME &
Soc'Y 1, 2, 69 (2003) (giving prison population rates by region, showing that Central Asia has the
highest incarceration rates of any region in the world).
149. See Tajikistan: Interview with OSCE on Human Rights, lRlNnews.org (2003),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=38333&SelectRegion=CentralAsia (last visited June
30, 2006); Interview with Dmitry Nurumov, OSCE/ODIHR Rule of Law Coordinator for Central
Asia, in Grundy, Va. (June 30, 2006) ("Despite increased options for alternatives to imprisonment
under the law in each of the four countries of Central Asia under discussion here, these alternatives
are rarely applied by judges, and even more rarely requested by prosecutors.").
150. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reports increasing rates of juvenile
detention in Kazakhstan although pre-trial detention statistics are not reported. See
http://ceecis.org/child-protection/ kazak-juv.htm. UNICEF reports juvenile delinquency is
"escalating" in Kyrgyzstan. See http://ceecis.org/ child-protection/kyrg._juv.htm. The situation is
similar in Tajikistan. See http://ceecis.org/child_ protection/tajik-juv.htm.
151. In Kazakhstan the prison rate has decreased since 2002 due to changes in the law, resulting
in decreasing prison sentences and increased use of alternative sentencing. This has been commonly
called the "Law on Humanization" which was adopted in December 2002 and changed a number of
provisions in the Criminal, Criminal Procedure and Criminal Executive Codes of Kazakhstan. See
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2003,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27845.htm (reporting a reduction in prison population
from 65,000 to 49,300 in one year). Due to these changes Kazakhstan reduced its imprisonment
63
2. The Judiciary
The judicial branch of government in each country remains weak and
lacks independence. 5  This situation reflects the historical development of
the judiciary in the former Soviet Union. Under the Soviets, a judge simply
agreed with whatever the prosecutor requested. '53 Judges traditionally relied
on the state for not only salaries, but also for housing and a number of other
benefits that served to reinforce their subservient and dependent role. 5 4 As
discussed below, no country in Central Asia currently gives judges the
ultimate decision about whether the defendant remains in jail pending
trials. 55  The Supreme Court in Kazakhstan acts more independently and
seems to be in the process of consolidating more power. 156
3. Prosecutors
In each of the four countries, prosecutors exercise extraordinary power
and remain the single most powerful institution within the criminal justice
system. 15 7 In all four countries, the prosecutor has the power to decide if a
rates, falling from fourth place to twentieth place in imprisonment rates worldwide. See,
http://wwwprisonstudies.org (last visited June 30, 2006).
152. See, e.g., JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR KAZAKHSTAN, supra note 58; JUDICIAL REFORM
INDEX FOR KYRGYZSTAN, supra note 73; Mission to Kyrgyzstan, supra note 73; COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2005, supra note 83; JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR UZBEKISTAN,
supra note 99.
153. See, e.g., Lauren Chen, Power Plays: Reallocating Power under the New Russian
Federation Code of Criminal Procedure, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 429, 432-438 ("[S]oviet
judges cooperated with the procurators to obtain convictions, assuming the role of assistant
prosecutors rather then neutral arbiters of the law.").
154. Id. at 436-437. Judges continued to speak about their dependence on the state for a variety
of benefits during the author's numerous meetings with judges throughout the former Soviet Union
from 1998-2006.
155. The term used in Central Asia is the "power to sanction arrest." A more familiar term to
common law lawyers is Habeas Corpus. For an easily accessible history of habeas corpus see
ACLU, Habeas Corpus: The Great Writ, available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/detention/
habeastimeline.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). In Central Asia, prosecutors retain the power to
decide who stays in custody. C. CRIM. P. art. 150 (Kaz.); C. CRIM. P. art. 110 (Kyrg.); C. CRIM. P.
art. 90 (Taj.); C. CRIM. P. art. 234 (Uzb.).
156. The Kazakhstan Supreme Court supports the transfer of the power to sanction arrest
(habeas corpus) from prosecutors to the judiciary and actively advocates for changes in the law to
consolidate and improve judicial power. See Press Release, OSCE, OSCE Conference to Promote
Fair Trials in Kazakhstan (Nov. 28. 2003), http://www.osce.org/item/7940.htm (last visited on June
22, 2006).
157. The UN Special Rapporteur on the question of torture concluded that prosecutors in
Uzbekistan have "excessive powers" and this contributes to widespread abuses and that "torture or
ill-treatment is systematic .. ." Mission to Uzbekistan, supra note 97, at 20-21. See also supra note
64
[Vol. 8: 1, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
suspect stays in custody while the police investigate the case or while the
case is pending in court. 158 With extraordinarily high conviction rates, 159 the
defendant's future largely rests on the prosecutor's decisions about what to
charge and what to request at sentencing.
4. Defense Lawyers
The criminal defense bar constitutes the weakest part of the criminal
justice system in each country. Defense lawyers operate under constraints
both in the law and in the surrounding legal cultures making it difficult for
them to provide a good defense for their clients. The impediments in the law
include difficult bar structures and code-based restrictions limiting what
lawyers can do for their clients. 160  In the Soviet Union, defense lawyers
practiced exclusively through the Collegium ofAdvocates.' 6' The Collegium
of Advocates collected fees and taxes and paid advocates. 162  Private legal
practice did not exist. 163  The Colle ium of Advocates determined which
lawyers were assigned to what cases. IA
In Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the law still requires lawyers
who handle criminal cases to work through a local Collegium of
Advocates. 165 The one exception to this rule, Kyrgyzstan, has no unified bar
134. For an analysis of the extraordinary powers of prosecutors under the Soviet system and the
legacy in Russia see Chen, supra note 153.
158. See C. CRiM. P. art. 150(Kaz.); C. CRIM. P. art. 110 (Kyrg.); C. CRiM. P. art 90 (Taj.); C.
CRIM P. art. 243 (Uzb.).
159. See supra note 124.
160. See infra note 168.
161. For a more detailed history of the Collegium of Advocates before and during the Soviet
Union see JORDAN, supra note 134, at 1-69.
162. For a brief explanation of the structure of the Collegium of Advocates under the Soviet
Union see The Legal Profession Reform Index for Armenia (American Bar Association Central
European and Eurasian Law Initiative), Ncv. 2003, available at
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/publications/lprilpri-armenia.pdf; The Legal Profession Reform Index
for Azerbaijan (American Bar Association Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative), Feb.
2005, available at http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/publications/lpri/lpri-azerbaijan.pdf (last visited on
June 30, 2006) (both state that "Under the communist system, no licensing system existed for
advocates, rather they had to become members of the Collegium of Advocates, which was
responsible for collecting fees and taxes and for paying advocates. Private legal practice, as it is
known in the West, was largely non-existent.").
163. See Chen, supra note 153, at 437. See also supra note 161.
164. JORDAN, supra note 134, at 40.
165. For a summary comparing the legal structures of the bar in many countries previously part
of the Soviet Union and former Soviet Bloc countries see JORDAN, supra note 134, at 128-131.
or required structures under which lawyers must operate. 166  This lack of
structure creates a number of different and serious problems preventing
competent representation of clients. 167 The criminal procedure codes in each
of the four countries preclude defense lawyers from independently
investigating a case on their client's behalf. 1
68
V. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN WESTERN COUNTRIES
A. Definition of Restorative Justice in Western Countries
Scholars and practitioners use the term "restorative justice" most
frequently to describe a range of alternatives to criminal prosecution.
169
This section will, by necessity, simply overview those alternatives 170 and
provide a context for the discussions regarding reconciliation in Central
Asia. Zehr, a leading scholar in the restorative justice field, defines
restorative justice as "a process [that] involve[s], to the extent possible, those
who have a stake in a specific offense and ... collectively identifqies] and
address[es] harms, needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things as
right as possible."'' Other authors define "restorative justice [as] seek[ing]
to balance the concerns of the victim and the community with the need to re-
integrate the offender into society. It seeks to assist the recovery of the
166. See generally, Legal Profession Reform Index for Kyrgyzstan, supra note 135.
167. The lack of a formal structure creates particular concerns in providing competent
assistance of counsel. Id.
168. Lawyers in Central Asia regularly discussed the fact that they cannot independently
investigate cases during numerous conversations the author had with lawyers at meetings, training
seminars, conferences and other events surrounding issues relating to the defense bar in Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In the context of Russian criminal procedure, see JORDAN, supra note
134, at 166-169.
169. Restorative justice can also refer to processes that are not intended to and do not supplant
traditional criminal processes. Examples include post-conviction victim offender mediation where
the goal is not to arrive at a settlement of the case, but rather to help the victims of often violent
crimes achieve some sort of closure to the crime and to help in the rehabilitation process of the
offender. This is the more common model for serious crimes in the United States. For a discussion
of how to approach this type of mediation and a summary of research of the impact on victims and
offenders see MARK UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION: AN ESSENTIAL
GUIDE TO PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 255-67 (2001).
170. There are numerous resources regarding restorative justice. For a good general
explanation see HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2002); CRITICAL
ISSUES IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Howard Zehr & Barb Toews eds., 2004); UMBREIT, THE
HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION, supra note 169; JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002). For a law review article that gives a good overview
of restorative justice, see Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A
Social Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251 (2005).
171. HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 130 (1990).
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victim and enable all parties with a stake in the justice process to participate
fruitfully in it."' I1 Restorative justice processes include victim offender
mediation, 173 family group conferencing, peacemaking circles, community
reparative boards, and victim impact panels. 
174
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and the majority of states in the United States widely use
restorative justice in their criminal justice systems. 175 Parties in the United
States most frequently use victim offender mediation, increasingly known as
restorative justice conferencing. 1
76
B. Development of Restorative Justice Programs in Western Countries
The use and creation of restorative justice programs in Austria,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the
172. Ivo AERTSEN ET. AL., REBUILDING COMMUNITY CONNECTION: MEDIATION AND
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN EUROPE 14 (Council of Europe 2004).
173. More recently, the restorative justice field has begun to refer to this process as "restorative
justice conferencing" to emphasize that not all the values or ethical guidelines applying to civil
mediators apply to restorative justice facilitators or the conferences they conduct. Telephone
Interview with Lawrie Parker, Executive Director of the Piedmont Dispute Resolution Center, in
Warranton, Va. (June 28, 2006).
174. This is not a complete list of the large variety of practices that fall under the general
heading of restorative justice. It is beyond the scope of this article to review the critiques of
restorative justice practices and the restorative justice movement as a whole. See ANNALISE ACORN,
COMPULSORY COMPASSION: A CRITIQUE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2004). For a review of Acorn's
work see John Braithwaite, Narrative and "Compulsory Compassion," 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 425
(2006).
175. For a good overview of the state of victim offender mediation programs in Europe, see
VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION IN EUROPE: MAKING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE WORK (The European
Forum for Victim-Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice ed., 2000). See also, MAPPING
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: DEVELOPMENTS IN 25 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (David Miers & Jolien
Willemsens eds., 2004). For an overview of the developments in the United Kingdom see
Restorative Justice: the Government's Strategy, (Home Office report) (July 22, 2003), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/rj-strategy-consult.pdfview=Binary; Restorative Justice:
An Overview (Home Office Report) (1999) available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/occ-
resjus.pdf . For a listing of programs in the United States see Directory of Victim Offender
Mediation Programs in the United States, Office for Victims of Crime (Apr. 2000) available at
http://www.ojp.gov/ovc/publications/infores/restorative-
justice/restorative-justiceascii-pdf/ncj I 76349.pdf; for a summary of the state of legislation in the
United States see Mark Umbreit, Legislative Statutes on Victim Offender Mediation: A National
Review, University of Minnesota, 2001 available at: http://jp.umn.edu/img/assets/13522/
Legislative- StatutesVOM%20NationalReview.pdf.
176. See, e.g., UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION, supra note 169, at
111-131.
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United States arose under similar sources of pressure for change. Lawyers
were rarely the strongest proponents of change, especially prosecutors, in
part due to a concern that the general public views advocating for restorative
justice programs as being "soft on crime." '177  Instead, non-governmental
actors pushed for the development of restorative justice programs. '78 Many
non-lawyer advocates for restorative justice see the involvement of criminal
justice professionals as an impediment to the restorative process and view
court-centered criminal justice processes with suspicion. 179  Proponents of
restorative justice programs often refer to a restorative justice as a
"movement," indicating that they advocate a fundamental social change in
criminal justice systems. 10 Criminal justice professionals later got involved
and now often play a central role in the development and implementation of
177. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 170, at 259-
261.
178. Id. at 259. These activists were not traditionally viewed as professionals in the criminal
justice system, although this is not universally true and "in practice a great deal of the initiative for
restorative justice programs has come and continues to come from professionals within the criminal
justice system." Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Revisiting Informal Justice, 38 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 139, 145 (2004).
179. An example of this is the argument of many restorative justice proponents that in
traditional criminal justice systems the state has "stolen the conflict" from individuals. In 1977,
Norwegian criminologist Niles Christie was the first to use this terminology in Conflicts as Property,
17 BRITISH J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 1-15 (1977). This concept of the state "owning the conflict" is used
by many writing on restorative justice. See UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER
MEDIATION, supra note 169, at 254; HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES, supra note 171, at 81
(describing the assumptions about crime and justice in American society). For a caution that
restorative justice may be "putting too much responsibility onto victims and offenders, and their
'communities of care' for crime reduction.. allowing the state to divest itself of its rightful
responsibilities" see Barbara Hudson, Victims and Offenders, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 177, 190 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds.,
2002).
180. See Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 170, at 254
("[restorative justice] is an important social reform movement that has been developing throughout
the world over the past thirty years.").
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new restorative justice programs.' 1 But they tend to follow and not lead the
push for change. 1
82
As discussed below, this pattern of development contrasts sharply with
the development of "reconciliation" in Central Asia. Criminal justice
professionals, notably prosecutors and police officers, are the leading
proponents for the increased use of reconciliation in Central Asia. 8 3 Non-
governmental actors are almost entirely absent in the discussion in Central
Asia about the use or expanded use of reconciliation. 
18 4
C. Types of Cases Referred to Restorative Justice Processes
In many, if not most, of the western countries that currently use an
alternative to criminal prosecutions, prosecutors or courts most frequently
refer juvenile cases to a restorative justice process.185 Referrals may happen
181. This broad statement does not hold true for some individual countries with active
restorative justice programs. Austria provides one contrary example, see Christa Pelikan, Victim-
Offender Mediation in Austria, in VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION IN EUROPE: MAKING
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE WORK, supra note 175. Some restorative justice activists are concerned that
the increasing involvement of criminal justice professionals in restorative justice processes will lead
to the "McDonaldization of Mediation." For a full discussion of this and other concerns facing
restorative justice practices in North America, see UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER
MEDIATION, supra note 169 at 291-302, and Carsten Erbe, What is the Role of Professionals in
Restorative Justice?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 293-98 (Howard Zehr & Barb
Toews eds., 2004). For an analysis of the roles that professionals play in restorative justice in the
context of two case studies, see Olsen & Dzur, supra note 178.
182. For a brief history of the development and institutionalization of restorative justice see
Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 170, at 259-263. For a
history of restorative justice in Belgium, see Ivo Aertsen, Victim-Offender Mediation in Belgium, in
VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION IN EUROPE: MAKING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE WORK, supra note 175,
at 153 ("A handful of small non-governmental organizations for juvenile assistance took the first
initiatives."). Regarding Germany, see Britta Bannenberg, Victim Offender Mediation in Germany,
in VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION IN EUROPE: MAKING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE WORK, supra note
175. Regarding Poland, see Beata Czarnecka-Dzialuk & Dobrochna W6jcik, Victim-Offender
Mediation in Poland, in VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION IN EUROPE: MAKING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
WORK, supra note 175.
183. See infra Section VI.
184. For an interesting collection of essays looking at the role of civil society and the role of the
state in the development of restorative justice programs in a variety of countries including Australia,
the United Kingdom and South Africa, see RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Heather
Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2001).
185. For an overview of many early restorative justice programs involving juveniles, see Paul
McCold, Primary Restorative Justice Practices, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES:
CONFERENCING, MEDIATION & CIRCLES 41-54 (Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell eds., 2001). In
the United States, twenty-two states allow restorative justice only in juvenile cases with twenty-three
after a conviction as part of a suspended disposition. 186 In the United States,
prosecutors and courts overwhelmingly oppose referring felony cases,
especially those involving sex crimes, to restorative justice processes at any
time prior to conviction and sentencing.187 Lawrie Parker, the Executive
Director of the Piedmont Dispute Resolution Center located in Virginia and
states allowing restorative justice in both juvenile and adult cases. Sandra O'Brien, Restorative
Juvenile Justice in the States: A National Assessment of Policy Development and Implementation, 4,
available at http://www. fau.edu/barj/survey.pdf (last visited on Feb. 22, 2007). For a discussion of
some of the current restorative justice programs for juveniles around the world see Willie McCamey,
Responding to Juvenile Delinquency, 3 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 3 (2001). For a
brief history of the early restorative justice programs in Europe (predominately juvenile) see
AERTSEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 17-18.
186. Telephone Interview with Lawrie Parker, supra note 173.
187. Of the 302 victim offender programs responding to a 2000 US Department of Justice
survey listing the types of cases they handle, only eleven percent reported handling sexual assault
cases, while seventy-three percent reported handling misdemeanors and sixty-one percent handled
juvenile cases. See Directory of Victim Offender Mediation Programs in the United States, supra
note 175. From this information it is difficult to glean how many of the programs handling sexual
assault cases handle them post-conviction as part of a rehabilitation program, the seriousness of the
sexual assault, and/or what overall percentage of cases are misdemeanors or juvenile. Although from
the reporting programs it is clear the numbers are significant. One of the first programs to use
restorative justice in felony cases in the United States worked "primarily with cases that arose from
felony arrests.. .set[ting] apart the Brooklyn Dispute Resolution Center from the growing number of
mediation and conflict resolution programs being established throughout the country, nearly all of
which would not even consider cases .of felony arrests." MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS
OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 15 (1994). See also, Maureen
E. Laflin, Remarks on Case-Management Criminal Mediation, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 571, 586 (2004).
However, many restorative justice proponents agree with ZEHR, supra note 175, at 11, stating that
"experience has shown that restorative justice approaches may have the greatest impact in more
serious cases." One practical reason for this is that cases need to be serious enough that the victim is
motivated to participate. That motivation can be lacking in crimes with minimal harm. For
arguments advocating the use of mediation in sexual assault cases, see Kerry M. Hodak, Court
Sanctioned Mediation in Cases of Acquaintance Rape: A beneficial Alternative to Traditional
Prosecution, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1089 (2004). See also Deborah Gartzke Goolsby,
Using Mediation in Cases of Simple Rape, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1183 (1990); Rajib Chanda,
Mediating University Sexual Assault Cases, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 265 (2001). One example of a
post-conviction mediation program for rape cases is from Denmark. This program focuses on the
victim and her recovery from the assault and not the offender. Karin Sten Madsen & Hanne
Andersson, The Challenges of Mediating Rape, Workshop 17 of the European Forum for Victim
Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice Proceedings conference "Restorative Justice in Europe:
Where are we heading?" Budapest, Hungary (Oct. 14-16, 2004) (describing a rape mediation
program in Denmark), available at http://www.euforumrj.org/readingroom/workhsopl7.pdf (hand-
out from the workshop on file with author). For a series of articles looking at restorative justice in
sexual assault and family violence cases drawing examples and conclusions from the design and
implementation of one restorative justice project, see Mary P. Koss et. al., Restorative Justice for
Sexual Violence: Repairing Victims, Building Community, and Holding Offenders Accountable, 989
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 384 (2003), C. Quince Hopkins, et. al, Applying Restorative Justice to On-
Going Intimate Violence: Problems and Possibilities, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUBL. L. REv. 289 (2004); C.
Quince Hopkins & Mary Koss, Incorporating Feminist Theory and Insights Into a Restorative
Justice Response to Sex Offences, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 693 (May 2005).
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a member of the Board of Directors of the Restorative Justice Association of
Virginia, notes an increasing trend of courts referring felony cases to a
restorative justice conference as an element of the criminal sentence. 188 She
notes that judges will reduce a sentence or incarceration time, on a case-by-
case basis, to create incentives for the defendants to agree to participate in
the post-conviction restorative justice process. 89
Parker's center has conducted between twenty and thirty restorative
justice conferences each year since 1996.190 About one half of the current
referrals coming from courts to her center involve felony cases.191 During
that ten year period, the center has handled only one felony involving sexual
assault. 192
Another expert in the restorative justice field in the United States, Linda
Harvey, reports that restorative justice conferences in most felony cases
occur after conviction. '9 She has worked for the past three years with sexual
abuse victims whose abusers were members of the clergy. 194 Despite her
dedicated efforts to offer pre-conviction restorative justice conferencing to
these parties, few victims have chosen to meet with their abusers.' 95 Some
victims have agreed to meet with representatives of the religious body
involved in the case, provided that those representatives have sufficient
settlement authority to pay monetary damages. 96  Only two Catholic
dioceses - one in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and one in Albany, New York -
agreed to the pre-conviction restorative justice process.' 97 Lawyers for other
religious bodies have expressed concern about the self-incrimination risks of




192. The case involved an assault against a woman's daughter by the woman's boyfriend. The
restorative justice conference involved only the woman and the former boyfriend. The victim chose
not to participate. Id.






making an apology or admitting guilt in the face-to-face conference at the
pre-conviction stage of the proceedings.' 98
These practices contrast with developments in Central Asia where, with
one exception (discussed in Section VII), legal professionals do not regularly
refer juvenile cases to reconciliation. 9 9  Instead, more difficult or
controversial cases, including violent crimes, go to reconciliation before
conviction.2 °° In sharp contrast to the safeguards provided in many western
countries, prosecutors make no effort to ensure that crimes involving sexual
offenses, including rape, receive careful screening that considers whether
reconciliation provides sufficient safeguards for the victim. 
201
D. Possible Outcomes of the Restorative Justice Conference
As practiced in the United States, parties to a restorative justice
conference have complete control over the agreed outcome of the process. 2
The parties can carefully construct outcomes that often do not involve
monetary damages. 20 3 For example, the parties may agree that the defendant
will provide specific services to the victim. 2°4 The parties may also agree
that the defendant will do community service in a particular location which
might be related to the crime (for example working in physical rehabilitation
center with car accident victims in a case of driving under the influence of
alcohol). 20 5 The outcome of a restorative justice conference ties closely to
the goal of "repairing the harm.
'206
198. For an analysis of concerns about using ADR in these cases see Michelle Rosenblatt,
Hidden in the Shadows: The Perilous Use ofADR by the Catholic Church, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J.
115 (2005).
199. Kazakhstan provides the exception. See infra note 473.
200. See infra Sections VI and VII.
201. See infra Sections VI and VII.
202. See, e.g., UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION, supra note 169, at
35-64 (describing the mediation process including a focus on party control).
203. Restorative justice literature provides numerous examples. See, e.g., UMBREIT, THE
HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION, supra note 169, at 85-109.
204. One study described six categories of outcomes from restorative justice: apology,
compensation (to the victim), reparation (to the victim's damaged property), community service, and
offender oriented outcomes (substance abuse treatment, anger management, etc.). MAPPING
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 175, at 176, 179.
205. One example from New Zealand required the offender in a "dangerous driving causing
death" case to make a donation to an education fund in memory of the victim and perform
community service. JIM CONSEDINE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HEALING THE EFFECTS OF CRIME 193
(1995).
206. See infra Section V.E.
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This focus on outcome contrasts with practices in Central Asia, where
parties in reconciliation agree to monetary payments and overlook more
creative or far-reaching results. 207
E. Safeguards Created in the United States to Protect Victims of Crime, the
Rights of Criminal Defendants, and the Integrity of the Restorative
Justice Process
1. Core Values of the Restorative Justice Process Used in the United
States
Most of the restorative justice processes used in the United States share
common values, terms, and concepts. 208 They appear repeatedly in the
English language literature on restorative justice.20  However, these core
values fail to appear in any discussion of reconciliation in Central Asia
serving as another important indication of how far removed current
reconciliation practices in Central Asia are from restorative justice as
conceived in western countries.2 1°
a. "Repairing the Harm"
The restorative justice literature makes frequent reference to the concept
of repairing the harm and the related concept of healing. 21I The literature
discusses this value in the context of the victim, the offender, and the
community at large. 12 In restorative justice theory, repairing the harm takes
precedence over punishing the particular offender. 13
207. Thorn, supra note 5, at 10-14, and discussion infra Section VII.
208. See, e.g., UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION, supra note 169, at
xxviii-xxix.
209. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 170.
210. See infra Section VIi.
211. See, e.g., ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 28-32.
212. See, e.g., id. See also UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION,
supra note 169.
213. See, e.g., Olson& Dzur, supra note 178, at 141.
b. "Victim Centered"
The literature also frequently uses the term "victim centered," and its
use indicates that the needs and concerns of the victim take priority over the
needs and concerns of the defendant.1 The process should consider how
the neutral and other participants treat the victim before and during the
restorative justice process, as well as recognize the needs of the victim for
additional support and assistance afterwards. 215 This term also refers to a
way that restorative justice distinguishes itself from court-centered
processes, which many advocates for restorative justice view as being
"offender-centered., 2 16  These advocates point out that court-centered
processes focus on the defendant's rights and the outcomes the defendant
faces (conviction, punishment and so on). Placing the victim at the center of
the proceedings and minimizing the role of the state can make restorative
justice appear more like a civil lawsuit involving two individuals. The
traditional court-centered criminal process, in contrast, pits the state against
one individual, with the victim reduced to playing a peripheral or often
nearly invisible role.2 17
c. "Re-victimization"
Restorative justice also seeks to ensure that victims do not experience
the process as victimizing or harming them further.2 1 8 This goal ties closely
to the value that the process be "victim centered. 2 19 The literature advises
214. See, e.g., UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION, supra note 169, at
xxvii ("restorative justice is a victim-centered response to crime...") and at 21-34 (using the term
"victim sensitive"); Mary Ellen Reimund, The Law and Restorative Justice: Friend or Foe? A
Systematic Look at the Legal Issues in Restorative Justice, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 667, 668 (2005).
215. See, e.g., UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION, supra note 169, at
21-34.
216. See, e.g., Marty Price, Personalizing Crime: Mediation Produces Restorative Justice for
Victims and Offenders, 7 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 8 (2000).
217. For a discussion of the reduced role of the state in restorative justice proceedings see
Olson & Dzur, supra note 178, at 141, and ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE,
supra note 170, at 21-28. The level of victim satisfaction after participating in restorative justice
processes is a continuing theme in the literature in this area. See, e.g., UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF
VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION, supra note 169, and Leena Kurki, Evaluating Restorative Justice
Practices, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE
PARADIGMS, supra note 179, at 294-3 10.
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practitioners how to make the process more sensitive to the victim's
emotions and needs.22°
d. "Support Persons"
Support persons exist both for the victim and the offender in western
restorative justice process. No victim of crime should enter or participate in
the restorative justice proceeding feeling isolated or without necessary
emotional support.221  Legal counsel, family, or friends may join in the
process to give victims support and advice.222 The offender can also bring
his or her support system and the neutral will usually require such support
for juvenile offenders.223
e. "Preventing Recidivism"
The literature also suggests that restorative justice processes prevent
recidivism. 224 Advocates of restorative justice hope that it gives an offender
220. See id. See also Restorative Justice Conferencing Training (materials for training, on file
with author).
221. See, e.g., UMBREIT, supra note 169, at 21, 32.
222. See, e.g., UMBREIT, supra note 169, at 32.
223. Family group conferencing (a common model for juvenile cases) includes a role for the
members of the family of the offender. See McCamey, supra note 185, at 7; Mark Umbreit, Family
Group Conferencing: Implications for Crime Victims, U.S. Department of Justice, at 5 (Apr. 2004),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/restorative-justice/96523-
family-group/welcome.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (discussing the important role of family for
juvenile offenders). Telephone Interview with Lawrie Parker, supra note 173, includes information
for mediators facing a situation in which the offender says he or she does not want a support person
involved. An interesting study from 1990-1991, included data on offender's parents' involvement in
the restorative justice process, both positive and negative. See UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER,
supra note 187, at 187-194.
224. See, e.g., UMBREIT, THE HANDBOOK OF VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION, supra note 169,
at 170-73, 190, 211-12; Aiden Wilcox et. al., Two-year Re-sanctioning Study: a Comparison of
Restorative and Traditional Cautions, Home Office Online Report 57/04, available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/ pdfs04/rdsolr5704.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2007); AERTSEN,
supra note 172, at 38 (summarizing various studies of restorative justice programs around the world
stating "a growing number of studies on victim-offender mediation and conferencing programmes
demonstrate a modest, but positive effect on reducing re-offending"). For a summary of the early
studies on restorative justice see UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER, supra note 187 at 15-26, 114-
118 (discussing recidivism). A recent study on recidivism in cases of driving under the influence of
alcohol in Australia showed no reduction in recidivism although it did show a reduction in drinking
and driving behaviors. Tom Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice and Recidivism:
the opportunity to understand the consequences of his or her actions, to hear
and understand how the crime impacted the victim, and make an offender
less likely to engage in crime in the future.2 5
As discussed below, none of these values, terms, or concepts play a role
in the day-to-day practice of reconciliation in Central Asia.
2. Ethical Constraints on Neutrals Conducting the Restorative Justice
Processes
Organizations focusing on restorative justice recognize the need to give
guidance on the ethical issues inherent in the process. 226  The Restorative
Justice Association of Virginia, for instance, adopted a "Code of Ethics for
Restorative Justice Facilitators." 227 The ten points of the code include: "[T]o
be professional and proceed with dignity, honesty and courtesy in preparing
clients for the conference/mediation; to be clear in understanding the limits
of a facilitator; to be non-judgmental in the evaluation and process of
bringing a case to conference; to be responsible for developing skills through
additional training and continuing education; [and] to understand that
Restorative Justice processes are not always appropriate for every
,,228
case ....
The Engagement of Offenders' Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RIS Drinking-and-
Driving Experiment, 41, LAW& SOC'Y REV. 553 (2007).
225. See, e.g., Patricia Gray, The Politics of Risk and Young Offenders' Experiences of Social
Exclusion and Restorative Justice, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 938, at 13, 950 (2005) ("The research
evidence cited in this article suggests that one of the most successful achievements of the
programme was its 'responsibilising' effects on young offenders, because of the way in which it
challenged their attitudes and moral reasoning, held them accountable for their crimes and
confronted them with the consequences of their behavior on victims."). However, most proponents
of restorative justice point out that "[r]estorative justice is not primarily designed to reduce
recidivism or repeating offenses." ZEHR, THE LITrLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note
170; CRITICAL ISSUES IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 170, at 9.
226. See, e.g., Victim Offender Mediation Association Recommended Ethical Guidelines,
http://www.voma.org/docs/ethics.pdf (last visited July 2, 2006); Minnesota Restorative Services
Coalition Recommended Ethical Guidelines for Restorative Practices, http://www.mnmrsc.org/
guidelines.html (last visited on July 2, 2006).
227. Restorative Justice Association of Virginia, Code of Ethics for Restorative Justice
Facilitators, http://rjav.org/index.php?option=com-content&task-view&id=8&ltemid=9 (last
visited on June 30, 2006).
228. Id.
76
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3. Other Core Values and Ethical Constraints that May Apply to
Restorative Justice Neutrals
Each restorative justice process may bring with it another set of
fundamental values and ethical constraints. For instance, in victim-offender
mediation or conferencing - if conducted by certified, registered, or rostered
mediators - the core values of mediation would also apply.2 29 Most scholars
and practitioners agree that mediation relies on three core values: (1) the
impartiality of the neutral, (2) party self-determination - both in the design
of the process and in the outcome chosen, and (3) confidentiality of
communications made in mediation to promote candor and trust.2 30 Some
jurisdictions also provide mandatory or aspirational standards of ethical
conduct for mediators.2 31  Typically, these standards serve "to guide the
conduct of mediators [in all practice contexts]; to inform the mediating
parties [about the process]; and topromote public confidence in mediation as
a process for resolving disputes."
2
229. In the United States, some state ethics codes provide that all professional ethics codes that
apply to a particular neutral concurrently apply. FLA. RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-
APPOINTED MEDIATORS, 10.200-10.690, 10.650 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Standing Comm. on Mediation and
Arbitration Rules 2000), http://www.flcourts.org/gen-public/adr/certrules.shtml ("Other ethical
standards to which a mediator may be professionally bound are not abrogated by these rules. In the
course of performing mediation services, however, these rules prevail over any conflicting ethical
standards to which a mediator may otherwise be bound."). See STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROF'L
RESP. FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS (Jud. Council of Va. 2002), http://www.courts.state.va.us/soe/
soe.htm ("These Standards are not intended to be exclusive and do not in any way limit the
responsibilities the mediator may have under codes of ethics or professional responsibility
promulgated by any other professions to which the mediator belongs or any other codes of ethics or
professional responsibility to which the mediator subscribes, such as those promulgated by the
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution or the Academy of Family Mediators.") (last visited
on Feb. 2, 2007).
230. See, e.g., JAMES ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 193 (2001);
KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 26-28, 262 (3d ed. 2004).
231. Seventeen states in the United States have mandatory codes of ethics which apply to some
mediators practicing within their states. These codes typically apply to mediators working in court-
connected mediation programs. See Paula M. Young, Take it or Leave it. Lump it or Grieve it:
Designing Mediator Complaint Systems that Protect Mediators, Unhappy Parties, Attorneys, Courts,
the Process, and the Field, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 721, 741 (2006) (listing states with
mandatory codes and the citations to those codes).
232. See, e.g., Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, (Am. Bar Ass'n, Am. Arb. Assn. &
Assn. for Conflict Res.), preamble at 2 (Aug. 9, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/
news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05.pdf [hereinafter 2005 Model Standards]. See
generally Paula M. Young, Rejoice! Rejoice! Rejoice, Give Thanks, and Sing: ABA, ACR and AAA
4. Processes in the United States for Protecting the Rights of Defendants
Participating in Restorative Justice Processes
Criminal defendants in the United States derive significant rights from
the United States Constitution. The due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the constitution provides: "No state... [shall deprive] any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" 233 Courts
have interpreted the procedural due process doctrine arising under this
constitutional amendment as limited to protecting individuals from an
arbitrary and binding deprivation of rights by government entities.3 In a
criminal context, due process requires: (1) the prosecution to provide the
defendant with formal notice of the charges; (2) the prosecution to show in a
probable cause hearing before a neutral magistrate evidence that the
defendant has committed a crime; (3) the court to appoint and pay for a
lawyer for an indigent defendant; (4) the court to allow a defendant to call
witnesses on his or her behalf and to cross-examine adverse witnesses; (5)
an impartial jury to try the case; and (6) a lawyer to represent the defendant
at trial if the defendant wishes.235 Constitutional due process also protects a
defendant from self-incrimination. 36
A restorative justice conference that occurs post-conviction, and after
the expiration of all deadlines for any possible appeals, would not interfere
with these due process rights or protections. 237  However, pre-conviction
conferencing could put a defendant's due process rights in jeopardy,
primarily the right against self-incrimination and the right to a lawyer.
Without sufficient guarantees of confidentiality, pre-conviction conferencing
could result in the admission of evidence at a later trial that a party or
prosecutor obtained by the disclosures, apologies, or admissions of guilt
made in the restorative justice conference.
2 8
Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 195 (2002)
(discussing the nine standards of conduct set out in the 2005 Model Standards).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
234. Nancy Welsh, Disputant's Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow
Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 188 (2002).
235. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 7-13 (3d ed.
2002).
236. Id.
237. For a more thorough discussion of due process concerns in restorative justice processes in
the United States see Mary Ellen Reimund, Restorative Justice on a Collision Course with the
Constitution? 3 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1 (2004).
238. For a good discussion of the serious issues surrounding the lack of confidentiality
protections in restorative justice processes, particularly pre-conviction, see Mary Ellen Reimund,
Confidentiality in Victim Offender Mediation: A False Promise? 2004 J. DiSP. RESOL. 401.
78
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Moreover, pre-conviction conferencing must also guarantee finality to
the case when the parties freely enter an agreement and the defendant fully
complies with the agreement. The conferencing process, related court
rules, and legislation would have to ensure that a defendant could not later
be prosecuted for a crime already resolved to the satisfaction of the victim in
the conferencing process.
VI. RECONCILIATION IN CENTRAL ASIA:
The criminal procedure codes of the four Central Asian countries all
allow the option of reconciliation in certain circumstances.2 4 °  More
recently, the legislatures have changed the laws to allow the expanded use of
reconciliation.24' Many professionals in the region's criminal justice
systems accept and promote this change as progress, with little consideration
of the types of cases and defendants for which these processes might be most
valuable.242 Instead, the discourse surrounding the use of reconciliation
focuses on the statistics of numbers of cases reconciled.243 In all four
countries, parties use reconciliation exclusively as a pre-conviction
process. 244 No one thinks to conduct "satisfaction level" surveys of victims,
245 motdsusos fdefendants, and others in the society. In most discussions of
reconciliation, the controlling interests are those of the state, as defined by
prosecutors and the police.246
239. See, e.g., Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal
Matters, supra note 26, at §3.
240. See C. CRIM. (Kaz.) art. 67; C. CRIM. art. 66 (Kyrg.); and C. CRIM. art. 73 (Taj.); C. CRIM.
art. 66-1 (Uzb.) (amended Aug. 27, 2004).
241. See C. CRIM. art 67 (Kaz.) (amended Dec. 2002); Law Number 221, Nov. 14, 2003,
KYRG.; C. CRIM. art. 66-1 (Uzb.) (amended Aug. 27, 2004).
242. Thorn, supra note 5. The author also cites numerous discussions between the author and
legal professionals in Central Asia between 2003-2006, including during the Nov. 2004 Conference,
supra note 20.
243. Thorn supra note 5, and discussion infra this Section.
244. Thom, supra note 5; C. CRIM. P. art. 269 and 391 (Kaz.); C. CRIM P. art. 26 (Kyrg.); C.
CRIM art. 66-1 (Uzb.) (amended Aug. 27, 2004).
245. The participants in the Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20, did not suggest or discuss
conducting opinion or satisfaction level surveys; see also Thorn, supra note 5, for a general
discussion of legal professionals' attitudes towards reconciliation.
246. Thorn, supra note 5; Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20; numerous unrecorded
conversations on reconciliation the author conducted with legal professionals in Central Asia
between 2003-2006.
79
This section summarizes the limited data available on how the
reconciliation process actually works in each of the four Central Asian
countries studied. This section discusses who makes the decisions in each
country to put a criminal case into reconciliation and what types of cases go
to reconciliation. This section will also describe at what point in the
criminal process each country will send a case to reconciliation This section
concludes that reconciliation in Central Asia shows little similarity to the
restorative justice conferencing occurring in western countries. Central
Asian reconciliation has virtually none of the values, standards, or
safeguards that could guarantee a meaningful, safe, or fair process for the
victim or the offender. To call it a restorative justice process is clearly
inaccurate.
A. Definition of "Reconciliation " and its Lack of "Core Values"
"Reconciliation" describes a process by which the parties agree to a
resolution of a criminal case.247  Although sometimes referred to as
mediation, reconciliation provides a process separate and distinct from
western-style mediation. 4 8 Little control, oversight, or guidance applies to
the process.249 A neutral third party (a mediator) need not be involved in a
reconciliation process. 250  Reconciliation conforms to no standardized
process under existing law in any of the four Central Asian countries.2 1  No
clearly stated standards provide when a case is eligible for reconciliation
(either pre- or post-conviction).252
No country in Central Asia defines in the law why reconciliation exists
or what the criminal justice system hopes to achieve through its use.253 No
statements in the reconciliation laws suggest that the process exists to "repair
the harm" or to give victims more of a role, or more satisfaction, during the
247. See, e.g., C. CRiM. art. 67 (Kaz.); C. CRIM. art. 66 (Kyrg.); C. CRIM. art.73 (Taj.). See also
Khodjaev, supra note 145, at 285 (describing reconciliation in Uzbekistan).
248. See infra this section.
249. As is discussed later in this section, the Uzbekistan Criminal Procedure Code is the only
one to give any specific requirements, see infra this section, and those requirements leave much
undefined including the role of the intermediary, if any, and any procedure the reconciliation process
should follow.
250. The Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes of all four countries do not specify that there
should be a neutral third party or give a role to anyone other than the victim and offender in the
reconciliation process. The exceptions are specific provisions relating to the Mahalla in Uzbekistan
and the Aksakal in Kyrgyzstan. See discussion infra this section.
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criminal justice process. 254  No statements in the laws suggest that
reconciliation exists to reduce recidivism rates.
255
B. Why do Cases go to Reconciliation?
Both historically and in current practice, reconciliation does not promote
"justice" for the victim or "make the victim whole. 256 It exists for a very
practical reason: to stop a complaint from proceeding into the system.
257
Currently the institutions of the criminal justice system in all four Central
Asian countries have very specific interests in how the system handles
individual criminal cases. For prosecutors and police officers, promotions,
bonuses, the reversal of demotions, and the withholding of pay raises and
bonuses depend on the percentage of their cases that result in conviction.
258
As discussed in section IV, nearly 100 percent of cases result in a
conviction.259  Superiors tend to evaluate police and prosecutor job
performance in these simple statistical terms. 260 A failure to convict or the
dismissal of a case can carry direct personal consequences for the criminal
justice professional involved.26' Judges know that their job security depends
on co-operation with all institutions in the executive branch and on high
conviction rates. 262 Judges share an interest in bringing in "guilty" verdicts
* 263 ~tiin cases. In this environment, all players, except perhaps victims and




257. See, e.g., Uzbekistan from House to House: Abuses by Mahalla Committees 15 HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 1, 28 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uzbekistan/0903/
uzbekistan0903.pdf (discussing Mahalla responses to domestic violence and stating "they interpret
'reconciliation' of family conflicts as the cessation of complaints, rather then an end to the violence.
Their intervention, therefore, is often directed toward placating the abuser, rather then helping the
victim.").
258. See International Crisis Group, Central Asia, supra note 70.
259. See supra note 124.
260. See, e.g., International Crisis Group, Central Asia, supra note 70, at 16-17; Ledwidge &
Oppenheim, supra note 141, at 168.
261. See, e.g., International Crisis Group, Central Asia, supra note 70, at 16-17; Ledwidge &
Oppenheim, supra note 141, at 168.
262. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 154.
263. For an explanation of the dynamics at play under the Soviet Union, which are still relevant
in the context of Central Asian legal systems see Chen, supra note 153, at 432-338. See also sources
cited supra note 154.
always a risk, however slight, of a "not guilty" verdict. A defense lawyer
may actively support using reconciliation so that he can receive pay-offs
from clients or so he can close a case with minimal effort or work.2"
Therefore, police, prosecutors, judges and defense lawyers support
reconciliation, in large part, when questions exist about the sufficiency of
evidence to convict, when they perceive the case as "difficult," or when it
offers an opportunity to engage in corrupt practices.
C. Central Asian Terminology for Crimes
Many western readers will be unfamiliar with the terms used to describe
crimes in Central Asia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, as each of
these countries drafted new criminal codes, many divided crimes into
"private," "public" and "private/public., 26  The category determines the
role of the victim and the prosecutor.266
If the criminal code defines a case as a "private" crime, the code does
not obligate law enforcement to investigate, or the prosecutor to prosecute,
the crime.267  In practice, the individual victim must complete the
investigation him or herself.268 He or she must bring the case to court and
meet the evidentiary burden required for a judge to file criminal charges.269
After that point (essentially the arraignment), the victim may still have to
264. Defense lawyers and other legal professionals mentioned these reasons numerous times
during the November 2004 Conference and during informal discussions the author had with lawyers
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan over a several year period. No written record exists of these
discussions.
265. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TEXTBOOK FOR UNIVERSITIES 78-80 (V.P. Bozhiev ed., Spark
2000) (Russian language publication, relevant provisions translated into English by Dmitry
Nurumov). The Russians borrowed this division from several European countries (Germany,
Austria, and Italy) who started to use this categorization in the 19th century. Id. However, these
divisions existed in practice in Russia starting as early as the 18th century. Id. During the Soviet
rule, the division was formally rejected due to ideology. Id However, in practice, this division
existed as the codes contained a range of articles whose prosecution depended on a complaint from a
victim. Id Under Soviet criminal legislation if a victim reconciled with a defendant in cases
requiring a victim complaint to prosecute, the court dismissed the case. Id. Under Soviet law the
following crimes usually fell into this category: insult, libel, deliberate infliction of lesser bodily
harm, and battery. See generally Kriminologecheskie osnovaniya prestuplenii chastnogo obvineniya
[Criminological grounds of "private" prosecution crimes], KrasGU. 2002 (Russian language
publication) http://allpravo.ru/ibrary/doc4204p0/instrum4205/item4208.html (last visited on June
22, 2006). In the beginning of the 1990s reformers of the old Soviet legislation re-introduced the
private, private/public and public prosecution division, often significantly expanding the scope of
private prosecution to "humanize" and "liberalize" criminal legislation. Id.
266. See, e.g., C. CRIM. P. art. 390-395 (Kaz.); C. CRIM. P. art. 26 and ch. 37 (Kyrg.).
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conduct the entire prosecution of the case without any assistance from the
state.270 Traditionally, the criminal codes define "private" crimes as any acts
involving the deliberate infliction of bodily harm, some sexual assault
related crimes, battery (including domestic violence), libel, and a range of
other acts. 21  The complaint of the victim starts the process, and the victim
can dismiss the complaint at any time.27 2 The criminal codes do not impose
an obligatory role on the state to bring or dismiss the complaint.2 3
However, in some instances, the prosecutor can decide to take over the
prosecution of the case.274
In a "public" case, the criminal code makes the state entirely responsible
for both the investigative stage and the trial stage.275 The process limits the
role of the victim to providing evidence and testimony but, unlike "private"
crimes, the victim does not directly prosecute the case. 7 6 Examples of
"public" crimes include murder, robbery, rape with aggravating
circumstance, fraud, and extortion.27 7
In a "public-private" case, official criminal prosecution starts only after
the victim files a complaint.27 ' The state will then investigate and prosecute
the case.279 Unlike "private" crimes, the victim cannot withdraw the
complaint and thereby dismiss the case.2 80  The crimes falling under this
category often include: rape without aggravating circumstances, sexual
270. C. CRIM. P. art. 393 (Kaz.). Pursuant to Kazakhstan's Code of Criminal Procedure, art.
392(6), "[t]he judge must render assistance to the parties in collecting evidence pursuant to their
petition." This presupposes that the parties know about this provision and make the petition as there
is no provision for the judge to do so without an affirmative request. Id. Kyrgyzstan has a similar
provision: C. CRIM. P. art. 330(2) (Kyrg.).
271. See C. CRIM. P. art. 33 (Kaz.); C. CRIM. P. art. 26 (Kyrg.), and discussion infra this section.
272. See C. CRAM. P. art. 390, 32, 37 (Kaz.); C. CRIM. P. art. 26, 330 (4) (Kyrg.), and discussion
infra this section.
273. See C. CRIM. P. art. 33, 37, 390 (Kaz.); C. CRIM. P. art. 329 (Kyrg.), and discussion infra
this section.
274. This most commonly happens in cases where the victim is vulnerable, in cases of "social
or public significance," or if the prosecutor is concerned that injustice will occur without
prosecutorial intervention. See, e.g., C. CRIM. P. art. 33 (Kaz.).
275. See C. CRIM. P. art. 32 (Kaz.).
276. See C. CRIM. P. art. 75 (Kaz.), and C. CRIM. P. art. 50 (Kyrg.) (detailing the rights of
victims).
277. See C. CRIM. P. art. 35 (Kaz.).
278. See C. CRIM. P. art. 32(3) (Kaz.).
279. See C. CRIM. P. art. 33-35 (Kaz.).
280. See C. CRIM. P. art. 269 (Kaz.).
assault, battery involving medium and serious bodily harm, family related
crimes, and some crimes against property.
2 81
This division of crimes exists in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and to a
limited extent in Tajikistan.28 2 Uzbekistan treats two crimes as "public-
private:" rape and sexual assault under certain specified circumstances.2 83
In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whether a crime is defined as
"private," "public/private" or "public" determines whether the crime is
eligible for reconciliation.284
The Soviet Criminal Code made a distinction between "serious" or
"grave" crimes and less serious crimes. 285 These distinctions are similar to
the distinction in the United States between felonies and misdemeanors. 86
The terms refer to the seriousness of both the crime and the potential
28sentence. 87 All four Central Asian countries continue to use this
terminology to divide various types of crimes.288 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan use it to determine which crimes are eligible for
reconciliation.289
Uzbekistan's Criminal Procedure Code does not recognize the division
between "public," "private-public," and "private" cases. In addition,
Uzbekistan does not specify what categories of crimes the criminal justice
system may send to reconciliation. Instead, it directly and specifically lists
all the crimes that can be reconciled.290
The criminal procedure in three of the Central Asian countries also
makes the distinction between dismissing a case on "rehabilitating" or "non-
rehabilitating" grounds. In all four countries, if the judge dismisses the case
on "rehabilitating grounds," the defendant will not have a criminal record for
that case and no official and lingering inference of guilt will exist.
29 1
Although the codes do not state this explicit result, in practice in
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, when a judge dismisses a case on
281. See C. CRIM. P. art. 34 (Kaz.).
282. C. CRtM. P. art. 32-34 (Kaz.); C. CRIM. P. art. 26 (Kyrg.); C. CRIM. P. art. 5(8) and 104
(Taj.).
283. C. CRIM. art. 118, 119 (Uzb.).
284. See discussion infra this Section.
285. See UGOLOVNYi KODEKS [Criminal Code] RSFSR (1965), ch. 4, art. 24, Note I! (listing
"grave" crimes), translated in HAROLD J. BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE
RSFSR CODES (1966) at 154-155.
286. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.04(2) and § 1.04 (4)(5) (proposed official draft 1962).
287. See, e.g., C. CRIM. art. 10 (Kaz.).
288. See, e.g., C. CRIM. art. 10 (Kaz.) and C. CRiM. art. 18 (Taj.).
289. See discussion infra this section.
290. C. CRIM. art. 66(1) (Uzb.).
291. See, e.g., C. CRIM. P. art. 38 (Kaz.).
84
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"non-rehabilitating grounds" an inference of guilt remains.2 92 This inference
exists even when the judge dismisses the case without any evidentiary
findings and regardless of when, in the criminal proceedings, the dismissal
occurs. 29 3 As a result, the defendant's record will reflect the existence of the
case. 294  In official terms, the defendant remains under a cloud of
suspicion.295
D. Reconciliation in Kazakhstan.
1. Who Starts the Reconciliation Process?
Under the law, no one specific institution has the authority to start the
reconciliation process.296 In practice, the parties themselves, investigators,
defense lawyers, prosecutors or judges may start the process.297
Kazakhstan's Criminal Procedure Code requires the judge in all "private"
cases to explain to the parties the possibility of using reconciliation in the
case. 298 This discussion should take place before the case begins and again
at the start of the trial.299
2. Source of the Legal Authority for Reconciliation
In December 2002, Kazakhstan's legislature revised the Criminal Code,
expanding the types of cases eligible to go to reconciliation.30 0 Under the
292. Under C. CRIM P. art. 84 (Uzb.), cases can be dismissed "without deciding the issue of
culpability." This is different from dismissal on "non-rehabilitating grounds" in the other three
countries since the code in Uzbekistan specifically states that no decision of guilt has been made. Id.
However, under Chapter 62 of the C. CRIM P. (Uzb.), the defendant must admit guilt as part of the
reconciliation. Id. This admission of guilt is required for the case to be dismissed under
reconciliation. The author was unable to determine how this works in practice with article 84 of the
Uzbekistan Criminal Code and whether dismissal under reconciliation carries, in practice, an
inference of guilt.
293. See C. CRIM P. art. 38 (Kaz.).
294. See C. CRIM P. art. 38-39 (Kaz.).
295. Interview with Dmitry Nurumov, supra note 10; see generally C. CRiM. P. art. 38 and 39
(Kaz.). Prosecutors can re-open cases, so the lack of finality poses possible problems or at least the
fear of possible problems for defendants. See C. CRIMP. art. 51, 271-72 (Kaz.).
296. See C. CRIM P. art, 38 (Kaz.).
297. Id.
298. C. CRIMP. art. 391 (Kaz.).
299. C. CRIM P. art. 391, 393 (Kaz.).
300. C. CRIM. art. 67 (Kaz.).
Criminal Code, the cases eligible for reconciliation include: all "private"
crimes, plus "public/private" and "public" crimes that are of minimum to
medium severity.3 °1  Crimes of medium severity shall be eligible for
reconciliation if the defendant is a first time offender. 30 2 If the defendant has
a prior criminal record and the crime is of medium severity, then the
prosecutor may approve reconciliation as an option.3 °3 In all minimum
crimes, and in all "private" cases, the defendant's prior convictions do not
affect eligibility for reconciliation.' °4
Under the Criminal Code of Kazakhstan, "private" crimes include:
trespass, battery, infliction of bodily harm with lesser injuries, forced sex,305
violation of constitutional rights, libel, insult, and the violations of the right
to privacy.30 6 A "minimal" crime is one that is "deliberate" and punishable
by less then two years in prison, or a "reckless" crime punishable by less
then five years in prison.3°7 These crimes include: illegal entry into the
home of another,30 8 assault, 309 and infection with venereal disease.31°
"Public/Private" crimes include: assault with serious injuries and without
aggravating circumstances, rape without aggravating circumstances,
performing an illegal abortion and various economic crimes. 311 "Public"
crimes eligible for reconciliation include larceny and torture.312
The criminal code defines "medium" crimes as "deliberate" crimes
punished by two to five years imprisonment.313 Examples of crimes under
this category include: hooliganism, 314 theft, 3 15 rape without aggravating




303. Id. See also C. CRIM. P. art. 38 (Kaz.).
304. C. GRIM. art. 67 (Kaz.). See also C. CIM. P. art. 32-34 (Kaz.) for further definitions
regarding public/private crimes.
305. Under the criminal code this is not defined as rape but is a lesser offense. C. GRIM. art. 123
(Kaz.).
306. C. GRIM. P. art. 33 (Kaz.).
307. C. GRIM. art. 10 (Kaz.).
308. C. CRiM. art. 145 (Kaz.).
309. C. GRIM. art. 106 (Kaz.).
310. C. GRIM. art. 115 (Kaz.).
311. C. GRIM. P. art. 34 (Kaz.).
312. Id.
313. C. CRIM. art. 10(Kaz.).
314. C. CPOM. P. art. 257 (Kaz.).
315. C. CRIM. P. art. 175 (Kaz.).
316. C. GRIM. P. art. 120 (Kaz.) (stating that aggravating circumstances include gang rape, a
victim who is a minor, and injury).
317. C. CRIM. P. art. 121 (Kaz.).
86
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Under the law in Kazakhstan, even when parties reconcile a case and the
court dismisses the charges, the court may still not "discharge [the
defendant] from criminal responsibility."3 ' Therefore, the defendant's
record will still reflect the charges, even in the absence of a plea of guilty or
a finding of guilt by the court. 319  The cases that fall into this category
include medium crimes when the defendant is not a first-time offender, as
well as cases defined as "public/private" and "public" that the parties
reconcile. 320 If the parties agree to a reconciliation in either a "lesser" or
"medium" "private" crime not involving death or serious bodily harm, the
defendant's record will reflect a "discharge from criminal responsibility.
3 2'
The problem arises with cases involving "public/private" and "public"
crimes, when the judge and the prosecutor have discretion to "discharge [the
defendant] from criminal liability., 322  Surprisingly, if the judge and
prosecutor do not agree to discharge, the case can proceed in court despite
the reconciliation agreement.32 3 In these cases, the reconciliation carries no
finality and raises risks of self-incrimination in light of the insufficient
guarantees of confidentiality surrounding the reconciliation process and the
communications made in the process.
324
In Kazakhstan, if the court agrees to dismiss the case due to the
reconciliation the dismissal will be under "non-rehabilitating" grounds.325
Although the parties have reconciled the case pre-conviction, the
defendant's record still reflects the charges.32 6
3. What Types of Cases go to Reconciliation?
From 2000 to 2005, Kazakhstan courts most often dismissed reconciled
cases involving offenses of larceny, robbery, fraud, rape, and reckless
driving.327  Courts also dismissed in smaller numbers cases reconciled
318. C. CRIM. P. art. 38 (Kaz.).
319. C. CRIM. P. art. 269-70, 307 (Kaz.).
320. C. CRIM. art. 67 (Kaz.); C. CRiM. P. art. 38 (Kaz.).
321. C. CRIM. art. 67(2) (Kaz.).
322. C. CrIM. P. art. 38 (Kaz.).
323. Id.
324. C. CRIM. art. 67(2) (Kaz.).
325. C. CRIM. P. C. art. 38 (Kaz.).
326. C. CRIM. P. art. 307 (Kaz.).
327. Statistics given by the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan to the OSCE/ODIHR. On file
with author.
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involving torture, bribery, extortion, illegal enterprise, abuse of official
328powers, and tax evasion.
As shown in Chart A, the overall percentage of cases going to
reconciliation, after the prosecutor filed charges, increased substantially after
the legislature changed the law in 2002.329 In 2003, the total number of
cases dismissed due to reconciliation jumped to twenty-two percent of all
cases filed in court from just eight percent the year before.330
Chart A:...
Year Percentage of Cases
Resolved by Reconciliation








As mentioned above, criminal legislation in Kazakhstan provides for
reconciliation in all "private" prosecution cases.332 Kazakhstan also permits
reconciliation of "public/private" and "public" cases of lesser gravity or
those in which the defendant committed a first-time offence of medium
gravity.333 Finally, the new law permits reconciliation of medium gravity
offences, when the investigator, prosecutor or the court has discretion to
discharge the defendant from criminal responsibility. 3 4  Thus, the law




331. Id. Percentages calculated from the raw statistics.
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4. When in the Criminal Process do Cases go to Reconciliation?
Under the law, cases can go to reconciliation at any point before the
court retires to deliberate a verdict.335 Cases do not go to reconciliation after
conviction.336 In a "private" case, the law obliges the judge to inform the
parties about the option of reconciliation before the case begins and also
requires the judge to "take steps to bring about reconciliation of the
parties. 337  In other cases, reconciliation most often occurs during the
investigative stage. 338  If the parties reach reconciliation at this stage, the
investigator can either send the case to the prosecutor or the court for
dismissal. 339 For cases reconciled later in the process, the victim will notify
the court of the reconciliation and request termination of the case. 340 The
court then decides whether to dismiss the case, to find the defendant guilty,
or to accept the reconciliation.34'
E. Reconciliation in Kyrgyzstan
1. Who Starts the Reconciliation Process?
Under the law of Kyrgyzstan, no one specific institution has the
authority to start the reconciliation process. 342  In practice, the parties,
investigators, defense lawyers, prosecutors, or judges may start the
335. SeeC. CRiM. P. art. 269 and 391 (Kaz.).
336. See C. CRIM. P. art. 269 and 391 (Kaz.).
337. See C. CRIM. P. art. 391 (Kaz.).
338. C. CRIM. P. art. 269 (Kaz.).
339. Under the usual process, the victim writes a letter to the investigatory agency stating that
s/he requests termination of the case and that they have no further claims against the defendant.
Interview with Dmitry Nurumov, supra note 3 1.
340. C. CRIM. P. art. 38 (Kaz.). However, the code does not go into much specificity on this
point. Id.
341. C. CRIM. P. art. 391, 393 (Kaz.). The Criminal Procedure Code is vague on this point, and
seems to imply that the court does not need to hear any evidence to make a finding of guilt. Also the
defendant is not entering a plea of guilty (since the procedure code does not allow for guilty pleas).
Thus, in essence, the court can find a defendant guilty in the absence of any evidence other than the
reconciliation agreement. This seems like a violation of the Constitution, specifically article
77(3)(1).
342. See C. CRIM. P. art. 29, 281 (Kyrg.).
process.3 43 As in Kazakhstan, the judge should explain to the parties that the
option of reconciliation exists in "private" cases. 344
2. Source of the Legal Authority for Reconciliation
Kyrgyzstan's Criminal Code allows reconciliation in all "private"
crimes, including battery, deliberate lesser bodily harm, libel, insult,
discrimination, and violation of the right to privacy.3 45  In 2003, the
legislature expanded the list of "private" crimes. 346 It included crimes that
would not seem to fit under this category, including offenses such as voter
bribery. 347 For all other first time offenses of a minimal crime, the judge,
prosecutor, or investigator may end the case by sending it to
reconciliation.3 48  As discussed below, laws also empower courts of elders
(Aksakals) to hear cases, although the laws do not make clear whether
Aksakals may hear criminal cases.349 In addition, the Kyrgyzstan Criminal
Procedure Code does not explain whether and how judges, prosecutors, and
investigators may refer cases to Aksakal courts.
3. What Cases go to Reconciliation?
Unlike Kazakhstan, no public information exists showing the types of
cases referred to reconciliation.35 °
4. When in the Criminal Process do Cases go to Reconciliation?
As in Kazakhstan, cases can go to reconciliation at any point before the
court retires to deliberate a verdict or before conviction. 35 ' Also, as in
Kazakhstan, the judge must explain the option of reconciliation to the parties
before a "private" case begins. 52 In a "private" case, parties who have
343. Lawyers and law enforcement all spoke about the lack of any single referral point when
discussing reconciliation with the author. See also Interview with Dmitry Nurumov, supra note 10.
344. C. CRIM. P. art. 281 and 330(4) (Kyrg.).
345. C. CRIM. P. art. 330(4) (Kyrg.).
346. Law Number 221, Nov. 14, 2003 (Kyrg.).
347. Id.
348. These include any intentional crime punishable by up to two years in prison, or a reckless
crime punishable by up to five years. C. CRIM. art. 10 (Kyrg.).
349. Law Number 221, Nov. 14, 2003 (Kyrg.).
350. As one of the countries participating in the November 2004 Conference, the
OSCE/ODIHR requested Kyrgyzstan provide data on the use of reconciliation. The OSCE/ODIHR
did not receive any information. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
351. See C. CRIM. P. art. 26, 29, 330 (Kyrg.).
352. C. CRIM. P. art. 330 (4) (Kyrg.).
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reconciled the case submit an application to the court for the judge to
dismiss the case.353 This procedure is similar to the procedure used in
Kazakhstan, although Kyrgyzstan's law less clearly delineates it than the law
of Kazakhstan.
After the parties agree to reconciliation in "private-public" or "public"
cases, the victim applies to the court or the prosecutor for dismissal of the
case.354 The investigator can dismiss the case, but only with the consent of
the prosecutor.355 In March 2004, the Kyrgyzstan legislature amended the
law to require a written petition from the victim stating the name of the
defendant, the apology, the compensation paid and/or agreed upon, and
completion of work or the services agreed to be completed by the
defendant.356
In Kyrgyzstan, the criminal justice system considers a case dismissed
due to reconciliation as dismissed on "non-rehabilitative grounds., 357  The
case, therefore, remains on the defendant's record.358
5. Aksakal Courts, an Alternative to the Criminal Process Specific to
Kyrgyzstan
The Kyrgyzstan Constitution includes a provision allowing for the
creation of "courts of elders. ' 359  The Constitution does not expressly
indicate that these courts may handle only civil matters. Instead, it provides
that "[c]itizens in the Kyrgyz Republic are entitled to establish Aksakal
Courts. Procedure for the establishment of Aksakal Courts, their power and
353. Id.
354. C. CRIM. P. art. 29 (2) (Kyrg.).
355. C. CRIM. P. art. 29 (Kyrg.) (amended Mar. 24, 2004, No. 47).
356. Id.
357. See C. CRIM. P. art. 28 and 225 (Kyrg.) (cases dismissed under article 28 of the code are
rehabilitative, and reconciliation is not listed under that article).
358. C. CRIM. P. art. 226 (Kyrg.) and interview with Dmitry Nurumov, supra note 10.
359. KYRG. CONST. art. 39 (2). Kyrgyzstan adopted a new constitution by referendum on
October 21, 2007. Observers criticized the referendum for failing to comply with international
standards including "credible reports about ballot stuffing and overstated data on the number of
votes." US Embassy Shares OSCE Concern Over Irregularities in Kyrgyz Referendum, ITAR-
TASS, Oct. 25, 2007 available at http:///www.eurasianet.org/
posts/102507us.pr.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2007). See also, Stem, supra note 69; Pannier supra
note 69.
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activities shall be determined by law., 360  Under the law "on Aksakal
Courts," which the legislature passed in 2002 and amended in 2003, these
courts should "defend violated rights, strengthen law and order and form
greater respect for the law, morals, history and traditions of the Kyrgyz
Republic.,,16' This law also gives courts or investigators, with the agreement
of the prosecutor, the power to refer closed criminal cases to Aksakal
Courts. 6 2 The Constitution recognizes that parties may appeal "the decision
of courts of elders... [to] the corresponding courts of the districts and cities
of the Kyrgyz Republic."
' 363
People typically use Aksakal Courts for dispute resolution in smaller
cities and rural areas in Kyrgyzstan. 364 The head of a police station in a rural
area stated: "[In cases such as petty theft and conflict between neighbors[,]
we usually prefer to hand them over to the Courts of Aksakals so the police
360. KYRG. CONST. art. 39(2). (Vasily Vashchanka, trans.). The previous text of the
constitution provided a little more definition stating: "when the sides agree to submit their cases to
them for review, [in] property and domestic conflicts and other cases anticipated by law with the
objective of reconciling the sides and rendering a just decision that is not contrary to the law."
KYRG. CONST. art. 85(2).
361. Law About Aksakal Courts (2002), art. 3 (Kyrg). The Law on Aksakals was adopted on
June 4, 2002, to implement the constitutional provision which came into effect in 1999. KYRG.
CONST. art. 85. The 2007 Constitution, under the language in article 39(2), seems to keep in force
this existing law. The Aksakals in Kyrgyzstan are a traditional dispute resolution body. There is no
clear history of the development of Aksakal Courts, but there are reports of their existence prior to
the USSR and it seems that the Aksakal Courts formally ceased to exist by the 1930s and that they
did not reappear until after Kyrgyzstan became independent from the USSR. For a brief summary of
the history of Aksakals, see Kelley E. Cormier, Grievance Practices in Post-Soviet Kyrgyz
Agriculture, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, 435 at 448 (2007).
362. Law About Aksakal Courts (2002), art. 4 (KYRG). However, there is no provision in the
Criminal Procedure Code allowing for these referrals or giving greater definition to how or when
such referrals should take place. There are obviously serious concerns if cases with insufficient
evidence are referred to Aksakal courts to ensure that "something is done" with the cases rather then
a simple dismissal.
363. KYRG. CONST. art. 85(3). It is unknown if any cases were appealed, but this provision
suggests the Aksakals are not informal dispute resolution bodies, but part of the formal legal process.
Id. The new constitution does not contain this provision. See supra note 19.
364. The literal translation is "white beards." As the name suggests, women are not commonly
on the Aksakals, although, as one court told the author during a meeting in 2003 in the city of Osh,
Kyrgyzstan, "[W]e have women to deal with women's matters, but they are not on the Aksakal
court." The conversation left it unclear as to what a "women's matter" might be. See also Kelley E.
Cormier, supra note 361, at 448; Renee Giovarelli & Cholpon Akmatova, Local Institutions that
Enforce Customary Law in the Kyrgyz Republic, and Their Impact on Women's Rights, Agriculture
& Rural Development e-paper, The World Bank, at 16-17, available at
http://lnwebl 8.worldbank.org/ESSD/ardext.nsf/22ByDocName/
Local InstitutionsthatenforceCustomaryLawintheKyrgyzRepubicandtheirimpactnWmensRights/$
FILE/Kyrgyzjocal.pdf (noting that in the rare cases when women are on the Aksakal court the
numbers of cases brought by women to the Aksakal increases).
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will then have more time for consideration of serious cases. '365  The
available data does not reveal how many criminal cases, as compared to civil
disputes, the Aksakal Courts resolve.366 The data also does not reveal how
many cases parties take to the Aksakal Courts that could be classified as
criminal in nature, such as domestic violence and sexual assault. 367  It is
clear, though, that people are taking criminal matters to the Aksakal Courts
for resolution and that the Aksakal Courts are another possible intermediary
for reconciliation.368
F. Reconciliation in Tajikistan
1. Who Starts the Reconciliation Process?
As in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the parties, investigators,
prosecutors, and judges may start the reconciliation process. 369 Although
Tajikistan's law does not expressly grant power to refer cases to
reconciliation or provide a process or structure for conducting reconciliation,
in practice, a number of informal organizations play a role in dispute
365. Batyr Mamyrkulov, V sud edut odni stariki [Only Old People Go to Court] IZVESTIYA
NEWSPAPER, http://www.izvestia.kz/news.php?date=18-11-04&number=7 (in Russian) (Dmitry
Nurumov, trans.) (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
366. Aksakals reportedly resolve a full range of disputes including criminal cases, property
cases and other community disputes. See, e.g., Renee Giovarelii & Cholpon Akmatova, supra note
364, at 6-8. The government of Kyrgyzstan seems to acknowledge the lack of information regarding
what the Aksakal courts are doing with criminal cases when they suggested conducting an analysis
of the Aksakal courts in their proposal to the United States government through the Millennium
Challenge Account. GOVERNMENT OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE
ACCOUNT THRESHOLD PLAN, SUBMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA , May 15, 2006, at 19, available at http://kyrgyz.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/
RRkyivSY3KhlBeygqlaW3w/MCAGov.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
367. Although it is clear that police routinely refer domestic violence and other cases that could
be prosecuted in the criminal justice system to the Aksakals, see Reconciled to Violence, supra note
3, at 63-73.
368. One source reports a total of 1,055 Aksakal courts in 2002. S. Murzaev Zh. Baltagulov,
Politichesko-administrativnye otnosheniya na mestom urovne v stranah chentra "noi azii [Political
and Administrative Relations on a Local Level in Countries of Central Asia] Forum po fiskal'noj
Decentralizacii v Central'noj Azii [Forum on Fiscal Decentralization in Central Asia], (Local
Government and Public Services Reform Initiative), 2002 (Russian language) (Dmitry Nurumov
trans.). On file with author. See also Giovarelii & Akmatova, supra note 364, and Reconciled to
Violence, supra note 3.
369. SeeC.CRIM.P.art. 104(Taj.).
resolution.370 These organizations may conduct reconciliation of criminal
matters.37' The study commissioned by the OSCE/ODIHR found Mahallas
(defined below) "are still generally noted to hold only informal roles...
local government officials rarely delegate authority to them.,
372
2. Source of the Legal Authority for Reconciliation
The Criminal Procedure Code of Tajikistan also makes only certain
offenses eligible for reconciliation.373 Unlike Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan does not specifically distinguish between "public" and "private"
crimes in determining eligibility for reconciliation.3 74  Tajikistan does,
however, consider the seriousness of the offense.3 75 In practice, Tajikistan
still makes a kind of "public/private" distinction, as the complaint of the
victim triggers prosecutorial action only in "public and "public/private"
crimes.3 76 The court may only dismiss "private" crimes when the victim
agrees to withdraw the complaint upon reconciliation with the offender.377
Under the Tajikistan Criminal Code, parties may reconcile minimal or
medium crimes and, as in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the prosecutor can
choose not to prosecute the complaint.3 78 Under the Criminal Code, parties
may reconcile all "lesser" and "medium" crimes.3 79 However, the Criminal
Procedure Code specifically excludes two crimes from eligibility for
reconciliation: rape and "violating [an] author's rights. 38°
The Tajikistan Criminal Procedure Code does not describe the
procedure of reconciliation in detail.38' If the victim confirms the
reconciliation, either orally or in a written application to the court, then the
court may dismiss the case.382 Article 73 of the Criminal Procedure Code
provides an alternative procedure.383 Under this article, for reconciliations
370. Thom, supra note 5, at 9, 13.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 9.
373. C. CRIM. art. 73 (Taj.).
374. Id.
375. Id.; C. CRIM. art. 18. (Taj.).
376. C. CRiM. P. art. 5(8) (Taj.).
377. C. CRiM. P. art. 104 (Taj.) (listing five crimes which fit the definition of "private"
including deliberate infliction of bodily harm without serious harm, battery, torture [non-state],
liable, and insult).
378. C. CRIM. art. 73 (Taj.); C. CRIM. P. art. 5.3 (Taj.).
379. C. CRIM. art. 73 (Taj.).
380. See, e.g., C. CRIM. P. art. 104 (Taj.).
381. See C. CRIM. P. art. 5.3, 104, 105,209,261 (Taj.).
382. See C. CRIM. P. art. 261 (Taj.).
383. C. CRIM. art. 73 (Taj.).
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of "public" or "public/private" offences of "lesser" or "medium"
seriousness, the investigator drafts a "reasoned statement for dismissal of the
case" which he or she presents to the court.3 84 The victim can also appeal to
the prosecutor for the dismissal, which the court must confirm.385 In court,
the judge can decide to dismiss the case based on the reconciliation
agreement.38 6 The judge can also decide not to accept the agreement so it
would proceed through the criminal process.387
3. What Cases go to Reconciliation?
As in Kyrgyzstan, no public information exists showing the types of
cases referred to reconciliation.388
4. When do Cases go to Reconciliation?
As in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, cases go to reconciliation pre-
conviction.389 However, Tajikistan's law also allows parties to reconcile
cases after a law enforcement agency records a complaint, but prior to
charges being filed. 90 Unlike Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, this timing for
the reconciliation of cases prevents any formal entries on the offender's
record.39'
384. Id.
385. C. CRIM. P. art. 210 (Taj.).
386. See C. CRiM. P. art. 261 (Taj.).
387. Id.
388. As one of the countries participating in the November 2004 Conference, the
OSCE/ODIHR requested Tajikistan provide data on the use of reconciliation. The OSCE/ODIHR
did not receive any information. See supra notes 31 and 39 and accompanying text.
389. C. CRIM. P. art. 104 (Taj.).
390. C. CRIM. P. art. 5.3 (Taj.) (limiting this provision to first time offenders and lesser crimes).
391. It is unclear how this provision is applied in practice.
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G. Reconciliation in Uzbekistan
1. Who Starts the Reconciliation Process?
In Uzbekistan, as in the other three countries, the law does not specify
an institution that can start the reconciliation process. 392  The parties, the
investigator, the prosecutor, or the judge may start reconciliation. 193
2. Source of the Legal Authority for Reconciliation
Uzbekistan's Criminal Code allows reconciliation in thirty-one
specifically listed offenses.3 94 Uzbekistan is the one country that does not
make a distinction between "public" and "private" criminal cases.3 95 In the
specifically listed offenses, parties may reconcile a case only if: (1) the
defendant is a first-time offender, (2) the defendant has not committed a
crime in aggravated circumstances, (3) the defendant admits guilt, and (4)
the defendant compensates the victim or victims.3 96 Uzbekistan is the only
country of the four to specifically provide for alternatives to criminal
prosecution for juveniles.397 These alternatives, however, do not involve
reconciliation as defined here.398
3. What Cases go to Reconciliation?
The Uzbekistan Embassy in Moscow reported on its website that from
August 2001 to September 2003 parties reconciled 13,520 cases, thereby
392. See C. CRIM. P. art. 583 (amended Aug. 29, 2001) and art. 584 (Uzb.).
393. See C. CRIM. P. art. 583 (amended Aug. 29, 2001) and art. 584 (Uzb.).
394. C. CRIM. art. 61.6. (Uzb.) (amended Aug. 27, 2004).
395. Id.
396. C. CRIM. P. ch. 62 (Uzb.). Included under this section are crimes in the Criminal Code
such as Intentional Infliction of Medium Bodily Injury, C. CRIM. art. 105 (Uzb.); Fraud, C. CRIM. art.
168 (Uzb.); Theft, C. CRIM. art. 169 (Uzb.); and Assault, C. CRIM. art. 110 (Uzb.).
397. Under section 6 of the Uzbekistan Criminal Code and chapter 60 of the Uzbekistan
Criminal Procedure Code, juvenile cases should be conducted differently and fall under different
provisions, theoretically providing greater safeguards.
398. Under the Criminal Code, first-time juvenile offenders who commit a crime of "minor
social danger" can transfer to a "commission on juvenile affairs." C. CRIM. P. § 6, ch. 16, art. 90
(Uzb.). In this situation, the prosecution will not try the case and the defendant will avoid a criminal
conviction. Id. If the juvenile is not a first-time offender, but the crime "doesn't pose a danger," the
court may substitute for the criminal penalties that a court might otherwise impose, such as an
apology, reparation, or an agreement to attend an educational colony (a low security incarceration
facility). See C. CRIM. P. § 6 (Uzb.); see also C. CRIM. P. ch. 60 (Uzb.).
96
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relieving the defendants from criminal responsibility. 399 This source does
not state how many total criminal cases prosecutors filed, how many cases
parties reconciled each year, or what kinds of cases parties reconciled.400
The author found no other statistics regarding reconciliation of cases in
Uzbekistan. The information clearly discloses, however, that parties in
Uzbekistan are reconciling criminal cases.
4. When do Cases go to Reconciliation?
Uzbekistan is the only country of the four analyzed to give any detail in
the description of the process of reconciliation. As with the other three
countries, reconciliation remains a pre-conviction process. 4° 1 Under the
Criminal Procedure Code, reconciliation can happen at any time before the
court begins deliberation if the victim requests the process. 40 2 Under Article
84 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a reconciliation can result in the
dismissal of a case.40 3 Typically, the victim submits an application to the
prosecutor or the investigator requesting dismissal of the proceedings
because the accused has made amends for the damage. When an
investigator receives the application, he or she should issue a statement
forwarding the request to the court.405 The court, with the consent of a
prosecutor, will consent to the dismissal within three days after issuance of
the investigator's statement.40 6
The court must establish seven factors to find the reconciliation
admissible: (1) the voluntary nature of the reconciliation by both parties, (2)
the reasons for reconciliation, (3) the voluntary nature of the confession of
guilt by the defendant, 40 7 (4) whether the defendant realized the
consequences of the act and whether he has taken measures to repair the
damage caused, (5) that each party is acting freely and without pressure in
399. Consulate General of Uzbekistan, available at http://www.uzbekconsul.org/ru/news/
sudebno-pravovaya.reforma.pdf (in Russian) (last visited on July 2, 2006).
400. Id.
401. C. CRIM. P. art. 583 (Uzb.) (amended Aug. 29, 2001).
402. Id.
403. C. CRIM. P. art. 84 (Uzb.).
404. C. CRIM. P. art. 583 (Uzb.) (amended Aug. 29, 2001).
405. C. CRiM. P. art. 584 (Uzb.).
406. Id.
407. Despite the fact that the code specifically states that a case dismissed due to reconciliation
is dismissed "without deciding the issue of culpability." C. CRIM. P. art. 84 (Uzb.).
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agreeing to the reconciliation, (6) a statement of the compensation for the
damage caused, and (7) consent of the defendant or their legal representative
to the reconciliation. 408 The court can then hear the opinion of the
prosecutor and the defense lawyer regarding the reconciliation agreement.
The court records its findings, subject to complaints by both parties.4 °9 If
the court does not find that the process met all seven factors, the court can
remand the case for pre-trial investigation. 410 Remand can also happen if the
court finds the defendant committed a grave crime.4 11
In addition, after a reconciliation, the court or prosecutor should not
reopen the matter.41 2 As noted above, the court may instead remand the case
for investigation if the reconciliation process does not meet the seven-factor
413test. The Criminal Procedure Code fails to set rules governing the
confidentiality of the reconciliation proceedings or statements made during
the course of the proceedings. This oversight raises concerns about self-
incrimination given the power of the court to find that the reconciliation
failed the seven-factor test and the court's power to remand the case for
investigation.
5. Mahallas and their Role in Reconciliation in Uzbekistan
In Uzbekistan, two broad categories of intermediaries exist: (1) a legal
professional such as a police officer, prosecutor, or lawyer, or (2) a Mahalla,
which is a local self-government entity.4 14 This section discusses this
second category of intermediary. The Mahalla existed before the creation of
the Soviet Union. 41 5 Human rights organizations criticize the Mahallas as
408. C. CRiM. P. art. 585 (Uzb.) (describing the "proceedings of conciliation").
409. Law on the Organs of Self Governance of Citizens art. 12, Apr. 14, 1999, No. 7568-I,
Republic of Uzbekistan. Under article 585 of the Uzbekistan Criminal Procedure Code, a
reconciliation procedure can only be finalized in court. C. CRIM. P. art. 585 (Uzb.).
410. C. CRIM. P. art. 585 (Uzb.).
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. C. CRIM. P. art. 583 (Uzb.) (amended Aug. 29, 2001).
414. For a description of the varied role of the Mahalla see Sievers, Uzbekistan 's Mahalla:
From Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Associations, 2 CHI-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 91
(2002) (tracing the history of the Mahalla from the medieval period through the Soviet period and
into post-Soviet Uzbekistan).
415. Kuatbay Bektcrmirov & Eduard Rahimov, Local Government in Uzbekistan. in THE
CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA 477-48 (Igor Munteanu & Victor Popa cds., 2001) available at
http://lgi.osi.hu/
publications/2001/84/Ch9-Uzbekistan.pdf; full book available for download at http:/lgi.osi.hu/
publications datasheet.php?id=84 (last visited on Feb. 25, 2007). For a history in the pre-Soviet
period see Sievers, supra note 414, at 103-111. For an explanation of the Mahalla structure and
[Vol. 8: 1, 2007)
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
governmental entities that operate without respect for basic human rights.416
Critics view the Mahallas as another tool used by the government in
Uzbekistan to control its citizens.417
Human rights organizations express concerns about how Mahallas
operate in Uzbekistan. 41t  The Mahallas not only function as dispute
resolution bodies, but also exercise a number of state powers and
responsibilities. 41 9  Human rights organizations criticize Mahallas for the
role they have played in assisting the government to crack down against
perceived religious fundamentalists or against persons who present political
opposition to the current government.42 °
In practice, the Mahallas do not act independently from the central
government.421  Their authority to act as intermediaries in reconciliation
cases seems to come from the Constitution of Uzbekistan, which states that
"local agencies of power [must] ensur[e] the legality, legal order, and
security of citizens. 422 This provision empowers Mahallas to act under the
law "on Organs of the Self-Rule of Citizens" passed by the legislature in
April 1999. 423 Little information exists on how Mahallas handle criminal
cases when the victim does not report the offense to the police or when
work in connection with local government see Uzbekistan from House to House: Abuses by Mahalla
Committees, supra note 257, at 6-10.
416. See, e.g., Uzbekistan from House to House: Abuses by Mahalla Committees, supra note
257, at 2-3.
417. See, e.g., Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights (Dec.
2000) available at http://www.mnadvocates.org/sites/608a3887-dd53-4796-8904-
997a0131 ca54/uploads/
Uzbekreport.pdf; Uzbekistan from House to House: Abuses by Mahalla Committees, supra note 257.
418. See generally Uzbekistan from House to House: Abuses by Mahalla Committees, supra
note 257; Sacrificing Women to Save the Family? Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan, Human Rights
Watch Report, Vol. 13, No. 4 (D) (July, 2001), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/uzbekistan/ (last
visited Mar. 16, 2005).
419. Under article twelve of the Law on the Organs of Self Governance of Citizens, supra note
409, these powers and responsibilities include "promoting employment of citizens; controlling the
use of land; helping citizens maintain dwellings..." and a range of responsibilities dealing with
maintaining buildings, parks, roads, bridges, "cost effective use of fuel, electricity, heat and
water .... For a description of the social service functions of Mahallas, see Marianne Kamp,
Between Women and the State: Mahalla Committees and Social Welfare in Uzbekistan, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, supra note 4, at 38-44.
420. See Uzbekistan from House to House: Abuses by Mahalla Committees, supra note 257, at
9-23.
421. Id. at 7-8.
422. UZB. CONST. art. 100.
423. Law on the Organs of Self Governance of Citizens, supra note 419.
persons refer cases to the Mahallas for reconciliation.4 4 Clearly, however,
in any case involving sexual assault or violence against women, the average
Mahalla lacks an empathetic understanding about these crimes, what
motivates them, as well as the need and obligation to protect victims.
425
People view the Mahalla, rather than the courts, as the venue for family
conflicts, regardless of the level of violence involved in the conflict.426 In
many cases, the police will refer a woman to the Mahalla before agreeing to
take an official complaint.427 The Mahalla will routinely attempt to
reconcile these cases prior to the time a prosecutor will file a criminal
case. 428 If the parties cannot reconcile the case, prosecutors will consult the
Mahalla in preparing the prosecution, as will judges in determining the
sentence. 429  Accordingly, no confidentiality applies to this reconciliation
process.430
Uzbekistan law does not require that domestic violence cases go first to
the Mahallas or that the parties attempt reconciliation before criminal
prosecution. Yet, this practice has grown, effectively reducing the number
of domestic violence cases victims and prosecutors bring to court. 431 The
Mahalla, whatever their value in handling neighborhood matters, have "no
authority to punish perpetrators for their actions and thus ha[ve] little power
of deterrence" against abusers.432
VII. PROBLEMS WITH THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS IN CENTRAL ASIA.
The current practices in the reconciliation process in Central Asia raise a
number of concerns. One concern arises in connection with who makes the
decision that a case should go to reconciliation rather than to a formal court
424. Human Rights Watch and the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights are the only two
international human rights organizations who have, to date, conducted any studies regarding the
Mahalla's resolution of criminal cases, and both focused on domestic violence cases. See
Uzbekistan from House to House: Abuses by Mahalla Committees, supra note 257, and Sacrificing
Women to Save the Family? Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan, supra note 418.
425. See generally Sacrificing Women to Save the Family, supra note 418; Domestic Violence
in Uzbekistan, supra note 417.
426. Although men have been prosecuted for driving their wives to suicide, these cases, if
brought, are not referred for reconciliation. See Sacrificing Women to Save the Family, supra note
418, at 40-42. See also Sievers, supra note 414, at 136 (".... Uzbekistanis recoil at adversarial
dispute resolution. Uzbekistanis rarely turn to the courts for assistance in resolving disputes."). Id.





432. Id. at 38.
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prosecution. Another concern regards the types of cases going to
reconciliation. Serious concerns exist about how reconciliations are
conducted and the impact this process has on the overall administration of
justice. Concerns also exist about how the process treats victims and their
role in relation to reconciliation. A "victim-centered approach" is neither a
reality nor a stated goal of the process. 433 That core value is also not a part
of the discussion surrounding criminal justice reform in any of the four
Central Asian Countries.434 Finally, serious concerns exist about whether
the rights of defendants are respected under current practices.
During the November 2004 OSCE/ODIHR Conference, participants
spent virtually no time discussing what is best for the victim and showed
little awareness that crime victims should have a voice in developing
criminal justice policy.435  Civil society in Central Asia, thus far, has
virtually no groups actively advocating on behalf of crime victims. 43 6 And,
because of the grave concerns surrounding the rights of the accused in
criminal cases, the discussion from civil society has understandably centered
on the rights of defendants. 437 This focus again shows that the advocates for
the increased use of restorative justice are judges, prosecutors, and police,
not civil society or academics. Observers could easily view this state-
motivated use of reconciliation as an extension of the dynamics at play in
other areas of political development in Central Asia. Governments in the
region actively discourage or repress democratic development by keeping a
tight grip on all aspects of political life and by preventing civil society from
developing into a meaningful player in shaping policy reform.438
A. No Reliable Definition or Description of the Process
The laws of all four Central Asian states fail to clearly define
reconciliation or identify the nature of the process. The laws simply seem to
433. See Thorn, supra note 5.
434. Although the criminal procedure codes delineate the rights and obligations of victims,
these provisions do not represent a victim centered approach. See C. CRIM. P. art. 75 (Kaz.); C. CRIM.
P. art. 50 (Kyrg.); C. CRIM. P. art. 55 (Uzb.).
435. Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20.
436. For information on the general weakness of civil society in Central Asia see supra note
131.
437. For a brief description of the role of human rights organizations in Central Asia see Scott
Horton & Alla Kazakina, The Legal Regulation of NGOs-Central Asia at a Crossroads, at 4,
available at http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/regional/cenasngo.html. See also supra note 131.
438. See discussion supra note 131.
suggest that the process commences when the parties agree to it. 43 9 There is
also no definition of whether the process should be conducted with or
without lawyers or with or without a third party (an intermediary). None of
the codes state that reconciliation proceedings are confidential or give any
definition of what information coming out of the reconciliation process may
or may not be used as evidence in the event the parties fail to reach an
agreement.440
B. Who Advocates for the use of Reconciliation and Decides when Cases go
to Reconciliation?
Unlike in western countries, where mediation of criminal cases is more
widely used, in Central Asia civil society and those outside the system are
not the prime forces behind the development of alternatives to
prosecution. 44' No discussion occurs about increasing victim satisfaction
with the criminal justice system. 442  Instead, the main proponents of
increased use of alternatives to criminal prosecution are those institutions,
police and prosecutors, who form the bedrock of the criminal justice
system.443 Those institutions do not suggest alternatives to create real
change in how society deals with crime. Instead, these institutions suggest
the use of alternatives to make jobs easier for the professionals in the
system. 444
In practice, investigators are most likely to "send" a case to
reconciliation. 445  This practice raises a number of issues. As discussed
below, this practice reflects the day-to-day concerns of the particular
439. See supra Section VI.
440. Id.
441. See discussion supra notes 131 and 133.
442. See generally Thorn, supra note 5; Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20; and countless
conversations and events regarding criminal justice reform in Central Asia in which the author
participated from 2002-2006.
443. See generally Thorn, supra note 5; Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20.
444. Legislators in Central Asia generally do not propose legislation in response to pressure
from their constituencies, and legislation is rarely the result of lobbying by civil society. See
generally Kyle W. Davis, Purging the System: Recent Judicial Reforms in Kazakhstan, 8 U. C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255 (describing legislative reform in Kazakhstan led by presidential
direction and without civil society input). The legislative processes in each of the four Central Asia
countries discussed here are notoriously lacking in transparency and openness. See generally supra
note 84. To get a copy of a draft law, prior to its adoption, can often be extraordinarily difficult, and
the average citizen or NGO rarely has access to drafts that are in-the-making. See, e.g., Gerald
Staberock, supra note 114, at 9-10.
445. This article does not use the term "referral" due to the reality in Central Asia that the
process is far too ad hoc and without definition to state that cases are "referred" to reconciliation as
they are, for example, in the United States.
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investigator, not overall criminal policy objectives. Without clear guidelines
about what types of cases should and should not go to reconciliation,
investigators are much more prone to send cases to reconciliation for reasons
other then the substance of the case itself. The OSCE/ODIHR study, which
interviewed lawyers and judges in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, found that
most interviewees thought that investigators would send cases to
reconciliation if they had a direct (and corrupt) monetary interest in the
reconciliation or an interest in ending a difficult investigation.446
Corruption may also affect the decision to seek reconciliation of cases.
In the OSCE/ODIHR study, many interviewees believed that defendants
commonly make payments to the investigator to ensure cases go to
reconciliation rather than to prosecution in court.4 4 7 Whether defendants
actually make these payments, in some respects, is not as important as the
perception of professionals within the system that this type of corruption is
endemic to the reconciliation process. These professionals show no
confidence that parties use the process fairly and objectively. This
skepticism affects the credibility of the outcomes of reconciliation. It may
also affect the finality of reconciled agreements when skeptical judges may
be inclined to overturn the agreement and refer it for criminal prosecution or
investigation. This lack of finality, in turn, contributes to further potential
corruption in countries, like Kazakhstan, where the investigator and courts
still have discretion to continue the prosecution after reconciliation. These
decision-makers can become additional sources of "extortion.,
448
Reducing caseloads and decreasing the responsibility of the system's
professionals for outcomes serve as the prime motivators behind the
increased use of alternatives to criminal prosecution in Central Asia.449
Winning convictions, or more importantly avoiding the risk of losing
convictions, explains the excessive reliance on confessions in the system. In
addition, police reluctantly register crimes that may be difficult to solve,
because registering an offense means someone must solve it.4 50 As noted
446. Thorn, supra note 5, at 12.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id. See also the Nov. 2004 Conference supra note 20.
450. Throughout the years the author heard numerous stories of police refusing to register cases
when people came in with a complaint. There can be multiple reasons for this, including that the
case may be difficult to solve. Another common reason is that the particular police officer does not
recognize the offense itself as a crime. This is a common problem in cases of domestic violence. A
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above, the failure to solve every case registered carries serious repercussions
for the professionals handling that case.
While the desire to decrease caseloads and decrease potential
responsibility for outcomes are powerful motivators for change in the
system, they do not necessarily lead to a nuanced or sophisticated approach
in policy decisions. In the context of Central Asia, where the laws do not
strongly protect individual rights and where the administration of justice is
riddled with serious problems, reconciliation motivated by institutional
concerns will not reflect values familiar to the restorative justice community
in western countries.
452
C. What Cases are Referred to Reconciliation?
Currently, as long as the crime fits into the general category of crimes
eligible for reconciliation, it is up to the discretion of the prosecutor or the
investigator whether the case goes to reconciliation.453 In practice, even in
crimes categorized as privately prosecuted, reconciliation does not appear to
happen in the absence of state involvement.454
From the information the OSCE/ODIHR gathered, it seems a significant
number of cases going to reconciliation are crimes of violence.455 With a
few notable exceptions, professionals in the system do not think that specific
types of crimes or categories of defendants, such as non-violent cases and
juvenile cases, are the most appropriate cases for reconciliation.456
third, equally common reason is if the police officer thinks that the case does not seem serious
enough to warrant creating additional work (such as a small property offenses).
451. See supra note 140.
452. See supra Section V.
453. See supra Section VII.
454. Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. The author also bases this statement on numerous
informal conversations between the author and legal professionals in Central Asia regarding the use
of reconciliation between 2003-2006.
455. According to the statistics provided by Kazakhstan in 2005 the following cases were
reconciled: 136 rape cases, 743 robbery cases, and two torture cases. Statistics on file with the
author. In 2003, 220 rape cases were reconciled. Statistics on file with the author. It is difficult to
clearly define how many crimes of violence were reconciled since some crimes under the
Kazakhstan Criminal Code could be listed and charged only as property crimes, while under the
same section it is possible that violence was used, such as a burglary. The statistics, therefore,
provide only an indication and not a complete picture of the number of crimes with violence that
reconciled. It is also possible that some sexual assault cases were charged as simple assault, and
then reconciled, making it difficult to gather a full picture of the number of sexual assault cases
going to reconciliation.
456. Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. The author also bases this statement on numerous
informal conversations between the author and legal professionals in Central Asia regarding the use
of reconciliation between 2003-2006. See also infra note 473 (referring to juvenile justice project in
Kazakhstan).
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Therefore, these types of cases are not routinely referred.457  As stated
above, the increased use of reconciliation does not reflect pressure and
concern from civil society, victims' rights groups, or academics who are
interested in finding better ways of dealing with crime in society to reduce
criminal behavior and better address victims' needs. Rather, Central Asian
countries increasingly use reconciliation to reduce caseloads and handle
cases "better" from the perspective of investigators, prosecutors, and
courts.
458  Thus, more complicated or difficult cases find their way to
reconciliation, a less onerous process than criminal investigation and trial.459
Sexual assault and domestic violence, therefore, feature heavily in
discussions of the kinds of cases that could be or should be brought to
reconciliation. 460  Even though victims do not commonly report the
crimes, 461 when they do, professionals in the system hesitate to treat these
crimes in the same way they treat any other crime.462 These professionals
commonly believe that raped women either "asked for it" or simply
fabricated the crime.463
The average investigator or prosecutor in Central Asia does not
recognize domestic violence as a crime, and certainly not as a serious
457. See generally statistics from Kazakhstan, supra note 331 and Section VI.
458. Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. The author also bases this statement on numerous
informal conversations between the author and legal professionals in Central Asia regarding the use
of reconciliation between 2003-2006. See also statistics from Kazakhstan, supra note 327 and
Section VI.
459. See discussion supra Sections IV.F., VI.
460. In the many meetings and conferences the author attended when reconciliation or
mediation of criminal cases were mentioned it was invariably in the context of a discussion about
sexual assault cases.
461. See, e.g., Uzbekistan from House to House: Abuses by Mahalla Committees, supra note
257, at 2; Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan, supra note 417, at 38 ("Rape is an underreported crime
in Uzbekistan, due in part to cultural norms that place high value on women's sexual purity.");
Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan, supra note 417, at 23-26 (explaining why many women in
Uzbekistan may not report domestic violence); Uzbekistan: Sacrificing Women to Save the Family?
supra note 418, at 14 (stating "all evidence suggests that domestic violence is a markedly under-
reported crime. Of the twenty women victims of domestic violence interviewed by Human Rights
Watch, only six had gone to the police.., none of the cases resulted in criminal charges being
filed").
462. See generally Uzbekistan from House to House: Abuses by Mahalla Committees, supra
note 257; Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan, supra note 431; Uzbekistan: Sacrificing Women to Save
the Family? supra note 418; Reconciled to Violence, supra note 3.
463. These are such common attitudes throughout the former Soviet Union that it would be
impossible to footnote each time the author heard them stated. One instance was when a defense
attorney from Kazakhstan, a former police officer, said during the November 2004 Conference that
"women bring it on" when they are raped.
crime. 464 Sexual assault cases also suffer from a lack of understanding and
recognition of their seriousness. 465  As stated above, criminal justice
professionals in Central Asia often view sexual assault as a crime of passion
and love, not a crime of violence and power.466 An investigator may not
express outrage when a victim agrees to marry her assailant.467 Instead, the
investigator may likely assume the assailant simply got carried away
expressing his love for the victim. 468  He may also assume she brought the
attack on herself by her behavior.469 Just as investigators have no specific
mediation training, they also receive no training about the psychology of
rape or domestic violence. 470 This lack of awareness makes it very easy for
the victim to face re-victimization. Missing in the reconciliation process is
the idea that the intermediary needs to be conscious of disabling power
imbalances and should prevent, by terminating the process, severely lop-
sided or damaging agreements.471
In practice, Central Asian countries do not appear to widely use
reconciliation in the types of cases where alternative proceedings are most
commonly used in western countries, such as in juvenile cases.472 Only the
Juvenile Justice Project in Kazakhstan, operated with assistance from the
Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation, focused on these types of
cases.4 73  This project reported relatively high uses of reconciliation and
464. See, e.g., Reconciled to Violence, supra note 3, at 23-26 and 44-47.
465. Id. See also supra note 463.
466. See, e.g., Reconciled to Violence, supra note 3, at 44-51.
467. The quote at the beginning of this article expresses this attitude, held by many throughout
the legal system. See supra notes 2 and 4.
468. See, e.g., Werner, supra note 4, at 84-88 (discussing reasons for increasing bride
kidnapping in Kazakhstan) ("When it comes to bride kidnapping, [men] believe that the state does
not regard this as an important issue.").
469. See supra note 463.
470. See generally Uzbekistan from House to House: Abuses by Mahalla Committees, supra
note 257; Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan, supra note 431; Uzbekistan: Sacrificing Women to Save
the Family? supra note 418; Reconciled to Violence, supra note 3.
471. The western literature regarding mediation of rape or domestic violence operates under the
assumption that these crimes are understood to be crimes of violence and that the mediator will be
sensitive to the particular trauma suffered by victims in these types of crimes to insure no further
harm is done. See, e.g., The Challenges of Mediating Rape, supra note 187; Hodak, supra note 187;
Goolsby, supra note 187; Chanda, supra note 187. See also Mary P. Koss et. al., supra note 187; C.
Quince Hopkins, et. al, supra note 187; C. Quince Hopkins & Mary Koss, supra note 187.
472. See supra Section VII.
473. This Soros Justice Initiative project is an example of what could be possible with a
concentration of resources and high quality personnel. Through this project all the judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, police and social workers dealing with juvenile criminal cases in two
district courts in Almaty City and Almaty regions were trained in issues specific to working with
juveniles and discussed better ways of handling specific cases. See
http://www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/ncjr/ptd/kazakhstanjj (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). In these
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other alternatives to court proceedings and correspondingly lower rates of
imprisonment than is the norm in juvenile cases in Kazakhstan.474 Yet,
unlike western countries, anecdotal evidence suggests that criminal justice
professionals commonly refer rape and sexual assault cases to
reconciliation. 475 However, the lack of statistics makes this referral picture
murky.476
D. Applicable Ethics Standards or Safeguards Designed to Protect the
Rights of the Defendant and the Victim
No applicable ethics standards regarding the use of reconciliation exist
in any of the four Central Asian countries.4 77 As discussed above, the legal
profession itself is bound by few codes of ethics and ethical guidelines.
478
No set of guidelines advises how to treat victims or defendants, how the
intermediary should behave, and when it is or is not appropriate to bring a
case to reconciliation.
No law in any of the four countries protects the rights of the defendant
during a reconciliation process. 479 The laws do not guarantee confidentiality
of communications made in the process. No law protects the defendant
against self incrimination during the reconciliation process. As stated
earlier, designers of the criminal justice systems in the four Central Asian
countries have not focused on the rights of the defendant.4 8 ° If the parties do
not reach an agreement in reconciliation or the reconciliation does not
terminate the criminal prosecution, no law or ethical prescription prevents
the use of any statements made by the defendant during the reconciliation
courts only two percent of cases resulted in sentences of imprisonment, and ninety-eight percent of
cases were handled through alternatives to court proceedings, alternatives to imprisonment, or were
closed. Statistics provided by Open Society Institute, Kazakhstan (on file with author).
474. Id.
475. See supra note 467; Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20.
476. See discussion supra Section VI for general statistics from Kazakhstan. As stated earlier,
Kazakhstan is the only country to provide these statistics. Id. Included in these statistics are the
numbers of rape cases dismissed under reconciliation. See supra note 455. Also as noted in Section
III, the statistics given in 2006 and those from 2004 are different. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text. According to the statistics presented in 2004, there were: 52 cases in 2001, 50
cases in 2002, 97 cases in 2003, and 94 cases in the first nine months of 2004. Statistics on file with
the author.
477. See supra Section IV.
478. Id.
479. See supra Section VII.
480. See supra Section IV.
discussions. Investigators can be present during the reconciliation
discussions even if they are not acting as intermediary. a ' In the absence of
strict rules of confidentiality, the defendant is unlikely to make admissions
or apologies that might lead to the type of "healing" contemplated in western
restorative justice conferencing. Moreover, there is no reason to think that
the investigator would not use the defendant's statements to assemble proof
of the crime in later court proceedings.
No country guarantees the defendant the right to have a lawyer, or any
other support person, present during the reconciliation processes. No laws,
rules, or ethical guidelines establish the role of a lawyer during those
proceedings. Further, no laws, rules, or ethical guidelines qualify or
disqualify the defendant as competent to participate in a reconciliation
proceeding. Nothing protects the defendant's right to agree to, opt out of, or
terminate the reconciliation process.4 82  While it seems clear that the
defendant must agree to the final terms of the reconciliation, it is not clear he
or she is making that decision based on informed consent.483 Many
defendants may think they do not have the right to refuse the terms offered,
especially if the case is then dismissed. Because access to lawyers is an
acute problem throughout Central Asia, many defendants go to
reconciliation proceedings without adequate legal advice and without
understanding their rights either in the reconciliation proceedings or in the
formal criminal proceedings.4 84
Just as no safeguards exist to protect the defendant, no safeguards exist
in any of the four countries to protect the victim. The intermediary does not
receive the pre-proceeding recommendations or written material, needed to
determine how best to handle the victim, particularly in cases involving
violence or sexual assault. Intermediaries also have no training or materials
on how best to handle vulnerable victims, such as victims of abuse. Law
enforcement officers in Central Asia do not receive training in domestic
481. None of the four countries define the reconciliation process with any specificity. See supra
Section VI. That lack of definition combined with the traditional role of investigators means that, in
practice, investigators can be present during the reconciliation. Central Asian legal professionals
frequently referred to informal reports indicating the presence of investigators during reconciliations.
Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20 and numerous informal conversations between the author and
legal professionals in Central Asia regarding the use of reconciliation between 2003-2006.
482. Uzbekistan does provide these protections under law, although it is unclear how this works
in practice. See discussion Section VI; C. CRIM. P. ch. 62 (Uzb.).
483. Due to serious issues surrounding access to counsel and restrictions on defense lawyers
throughout Central Asia, it is unlikely that defendants in reconciliation proceedings are receiving
better legal assistance then those going through the traditional criminal justice system. See
discussion supra Section IV.F.4.
484. Id.
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violence or sexual assault cases as part of their standard training.4 85  The
same is true for prosecutors and defense lawyers.486 The intermediary also
operates in a vacuum of information about how to handle special kinds of
cases. In Uzbekistan where, as stated above, Mahallas "reconcile" cases of
domestic violence, the intermediary commonly directs a woman to change
her behavior or endure the abuse a.48  Austria, in sharp contrast, may refer
domestic violence cases to mediation, but always with the clear
understanding that the abuser, not the victim, is responsible for the abuse
and for changing his or her behavior.488
E. Intermediary Selection, Impartiality, and Training
No law prescribes who might act as an intermediary in reconciliation
proceedings. No law, rule, or ethical guideline requires any special training
or certification for intermediaries. None of the four countries have any
rules, regulations or standards (in law or practice) governing the impartiality
of the intermediary.4 8 9  In the absence of any training for the role of
reconciliation intermediaries or ethical guidelines, investigators playing that
485. For an analysis of the many challenges that police face in Central Asia, including lack of
training see Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform. supra note 70. For an example of training
of police see Press Release, OSCE/ODIHR: ODIHR helps train police and change attitudes to
combat domestic violence, Oct. 19, 2007, available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_2_27
443.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
486. For a general discussion of prosecutorial training in Kyrgyzstan, see Prosecutorial Reform
Index for Kyrgyzstan, supra note 70, at 10-12. Prosecutors generally receive training through
national prosecutor training centers. Id. The quality of the training is variable and depending on the
country, the center may receive international assistance (as in Kyrgyzstan). Id. Defense lawyers
have fewer resources and few training programs devoted to generally improving their skills, much
less specific issues such as domestic violence or sexual assault. For a general discussion of lawyer
education and training, see Legal Profession Reform Index for Kyrgyzstan, supra note 135, at 14-22,
39-41.
487. Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan, supra note 417, at 38.
488. See Victim Offender Mediation in Cases of Domestic Violence, Workshop 17 of the
European Forum for Victim Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice Proceedings, from the
conference, "Restorative Justice in Europe: Where are we heading?" Budapest, Hungary, Oct. 14-16,
2004, available at http:///www.euforumj.org/readingroom/workshop I7.pdf.
489. The lack of training is not unique to intermediaries. However, this situation is exacerbated
by the fact that no state recognizes or formalizes the position of intermediary. The Aksakals in
Kyrgyzstan and the Mahallas in Uzbekistan present exceptions. However, neither Aksakals nor
Mahallas received extensive training. See, e.g., Reconciled to Violence, supra note 3, at 66-70
(providing examples illustrating Aksakals attitudes towards domestic violence indicating the lack of
training).
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role often enter into the task with the view that they should control the result
to ensure the "right" thing happens.49 °
In two countries, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, alternatives to the court
process can also happen through the semi-formal structures of the Courts of
Elders (Aksakals) and the Mahallas.4 9' Parties may also use intermediaries
drawn from the legal profession or proceed without an intermediary.492
Police investigators, lawyers, Mahallas, or Courts of Elders serve as the
intermediary in reconciliation proceedings. All four groups share a lack of
mediation training and lack a set of core values safeguarding the victim, the
defendant, and the integrity of the process. These groups share, however,
the common goal of reaching an agreement during all reconciliations.49 3
F. How does the Intermediary Conduct the Reconciliation?
As discussed above, the reconciliation process itself is vaguely defined
in all four countries in Central Asia. No rules or standards exist describing
how the intermediary or parties should conduct the reconciliation. Unlike in
western victim-offender conferencing practice, intermediaries do not spend
extensive amounts of time (or usually any time at all) preparing the victim
and the offender for the reconciliation.494 The intermediary may conduct
separate meetings with each party, but he or she would use the meetings to
establish a monetary settlement range.495 Because reconciliation in Central
Asia does not focus on the emotional and psychological needs of the parties
and because the process typically results in a payment, the intermediary
490. During the November 2004 Conference, discussion surrounding the role of the mediator
focused on the idea that the mediator should "control the outcome." Many conference participants
made statements to the effect that if the mediator does not control the outcome, then he is failing to
do his job because "someone has to make sure the right thing happens." The idea that the victim and
the offender could jointly arrive at the "right" outcome without the process being controlled or
directed by the mediator was not generally accepted by the participants. Nov. 2004 Conference,
supra note 20.
491. See supra Section VI.E.4. and VI.G.4.
492. See Section VI.
493. Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. See discussion regarding reconciliations by
Aksakals in Kyrgyzstan, Reconciled to Violence, supra note 3, at 66-70, regarding Mahallas in
Uzbekistan in Uzbekistan from House to House: Abuses by Mahalla Committees, supra note 257,
and Sacrificing Women to Save the Family? supra note 418. See also Domestic Violence in
Uzbekistan supra note 417.
494. Not a single participant at the November 2004 Conference raised the issue of intermediary
preparation. Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. Intermediaries receive no training and thus far
none of the four countries recognizes intermediaries as a separate profession in need of regulation or
support. See supra note 489; see generally Section VI.
495. See Thom, supra note 5; Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20.
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likely asks the parties only two questions: "How much do you want?" and
"How much can you pay?
' 496
Intermediaries have no concept that the intermediary may adopt
different "styles" of interventions and behavior when conducting the
reconciliation.497 The reconciliation does not necessarily happen with both
parties meeting face-to-face. 498  An intermediary may conduct "shuttle
diplomacy" by going back-and-forth between each party with the goal of
getting a written agreement. 499  This style reinforces the perception that
reconciliation is merely a negotiation over money.
1. Support of Party Self-Determination, Informed Decision-Making,
and the Right of the Party to "Opt-out"
Nothing requires the intermediary to conduct the reconciliation in a way
that supports party self-determination or ensures informed decision making.
These concepts find no expression in the criminal procedure practice in
Central Asia. Lawyers rarely see their role as an advisor to help their client
make an informed decision about how to handle the case.5 ° ° In some ways,
this constrained role simply reflects the lack of options available to
defendants in these systems.5 °' Unless the parties reconcile a case or the
judge or prosecutor dismisses the case for some other reason prior to trial,
the defendant can expect the judge to convict him or her and impose the
sentence requested by the prosecutor. °2
The intermediary does not generally see his role as informing the
defendant or the victim about available options or possible outcomes. 3 Nor
496. See Thorn, supra note 5; Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20.
497. See, e.g., Paula Young, The "Who " of Mediation, Part I: A New Look at Mediator Styles?
ST. LOUIS LAW. (Oct. 2004), available at http://mediate.com/articles/youngl 5.cfm.
498. See generally supra Section VI (discussing the few regulations surrounding reconciliation
in each country).
499. Id.
500. See supra Section IV.F.4.
501. See supra Section IV.F.
502. See supra note 124, and discussion supra Section IV.F.
503. See Thorn, supra note 5; Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. The author also bases this
statement on numerous informal conversations between the author and legal professionals in Central
Asia regarding the use of reconciliation between 2003-2006.
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will the intermediary ensure that the victim's wishes are paramount in the
process of reconciliation.5°4
The intermediary also does not see reconciliation as a process "driven"
or "controlled" by the parties. The concept of "self-determination" and
allowing the parties to decide the outcome flies in the face of common
cultural understandings of the individual, particularly when compared to
"experts" such as police officers who view themselves as having superior
knowledge and, therefore, more insight and ability to ensure that the "right"
thing happens at the end of the reconciliation. °5
No one understands the concept that either the victim or the defendant
can "opt-out" of the reconciliation.10 6 The conceptual starting point for the
intermediary is to think that if the case can go to reconciliation then both
parties should be grateful for the referral and should reach the "right"
conclusion (one directed by the intermediary). 50 7  Often cases go to
reconciliation when the investigator (who is frequently the intermediary)
thinks that the victim will not want to proceed with the prosecution or will
not be a reliable witness. 50 8 Intermediary-Investigators frequently hold this
perception in domestic violence and sexual assault cases. 50 9  The
intermediary-investigator will be concerned if either party "opts out" of the
reconciliation.5 1° If either party opts-out, the case will go forward in court
and may not result in a conviction, which would create an unacceptable
outcome for the average intermediary.511
504. See Thorn, supra note 5; Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. The author also bases this
statement on numerous informal conversations between the author and legal professionals in Central
Asia regarding the use of reconciliation between 2003-2006.
505. See supra note 490. The author also bases this statement on numerous informal
conversations between the author and legal professionals in Central Asia regarding the use of
reconciliation between 2003-2006.
506. Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. The author also bases this statement on numerous
informal conversations between the author and legal professionals in Central Asia regarding the use
of reconciliation between 2003-2006.
507. Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. The author also bases this statement on numerous
informal conversations between the author and legal professionals in Central Asia regarding the use
of reconciliation between 2003-2006.
508. Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. The author also bases this statement on numerous
informal conversations between the author and legal professionals in Central Asia regarding the use
of reconciliation between 2003-2006.
509. Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. The author also bases this statement on numerous
informal conversations between the author and legal professionals in Central Asia regarding the use
of reconciliation between 2003-2006.
510. Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20. The author also bases this statement on numerous
informal conversations between the author and legal professionals in Central Asia regarding the use
of reconciliation between 2003-2006.
511. See supra Section IV.
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2. Presence of Counsel or Support Persons
As noted above, no country in Central Asia requires or specifically
allows for the presence of lawyers or support persons during the
reconciliation process.5 12  Therefore, in practice, the intermediary decides
who can attend, and he may or may not allow the presence of support
persons and other people aside from the victim and the defendant." 3
Uzbekistan does require the presence of the prosecutor, defense lawyer, and
the victim during the subsequent court hearings after the parties reach a
reconciliation agreement and before the court agrees to accept it.
5 14
3. Typical Outcomes of Reconciliation
As stated above, criminal justice professionals in Central Asia see
reconciliation as a means to a financial end. Prosecutors and courts consider
cases "reconciled" if the victim agrees to a monetary pay-off. Parties do not
typically talk about other non-monetary concerns (such as an apology,
community service of some type, or specific performance of a repair of
property). When most of the population of these countries lives in or near
poverty,"' "apologies are worth nothing next to money. ' 16 Lawyers
surveyed by the OSCE/ODIHR found reconciliation "centered on the
victims' desires for material benefit and the defendants' desire to escape
judgment." '5 17
512. See supra Section IV.
513. See supra Section IV
514. C. CRIM. P. ch. 62 (Uzb.).
515. See CIA, Kazakhstan, supra note 43. See also supra notes 59, 74 and 88; United Nations
Development Program, Human Development Report 2006, at 284-285, http://hdr.undp.org/en/
media/hdr06-complete.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). In development terms all three countries rate
in the "medium" category. Id. Kazakhstan rates 79th in the world out of a total of 177 countries.
The ratings drop for Kyrgyzstan rating at 110th, Uzbekistan at I 13th and Tajikistan at 122nd Id.
Tajikistan ranks lowest for countries in the former Soviet Union. UNDP includes Gross Domestic
Product and other factors such as literacy and life expectancy in calculating the Human Development
Index. Id.
516. Thom, supra note 5, at 11.
517. Id. (referring to interviews in Kazakhstan). In addition, from informal discussions the
author had with legal professionals from the other three Central Asian countries, it is clear that this
perception is not unique to lawyers from Kazakhstan.
With the exception of the occasional story about parties to a rape case
agreeing to marry, no stories and no reports exist of parties agreeing to any
outcome other than money. 5
1 8
VIII. CONCLUSION
The international community, scholars, and criminal justice
professionals cannot assume the increased use in Central Asia of alternatives
to criminal court proceedings, especially reconciliation, signals reform or
represents a more enlightened approach to criminal justice policy in the
region. While undoubtedly examples exist of good practices where the use
of reconciliation helped the victim, prevented the offender from going to
prison, and aided in rehabilitation to prevent future offending, these
examples do not appear to represent the trend in Central Asia. Instead, the
desire of criminal justice professionals to decrease their caseloads,
particularly of difficult cases not likely to result in a conviction or of cases
perceived as not worthy of public prosecution, such as domestic violence
and sexual assault cases, motivates the greater use of reconciliation.
Therefore, those analyzing reconciliation, for financial assistance or other
reasons, must consider its impact on the rights of defendants, the protection
of victims, the limited outcomes of the process, and reconciliation's place in
systems operating on pay-offs and other forms of corruption.
Defendants' rights, as discussed earlier, remain acutely disregarded in
the day-to-day practice of criminal law throughout Central Asia.
Legislatures have increased the types of cases eligible for reconciliation
without sufficiently analyzing what types of defendants, such as juveniles,
might benefit greatly from this alternative process. Criminal justice
professionals and legislative bodies in Central Asia have not discussed the
diversion of juvenile cases to alternative processes, even though western
countries often started their restorative justice alternatives there. The
criminal defendants' rights need further consideration, including the right to
counsel and confidentiality of the reconciliation proceedings. Due to this
disregard, international organizations must take care to express concerns
about defendants' rights if they choose to provide assistance to these
programs in any of the four countries.
Victims' rights also require heightened focus. When an intermediary
simply wants to end the case through reconciliation, other considerations,
including victim protection, welfare, or satisfaction, naturally receive lower
priority. Cases involving domestic violence and sexual assault, in a region
518. See generally Thorn, supra note 5; see also Nov. 2004 Conference, supra note 20.
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with a poor record of protecting women, only highlight the risk of using this
process indiscriminately. Intermediaries should at least have training on
issues such as sexual assault and domestic violence to begin to address
concerns about victims' rights. Surveys of victims, looking particularly at
how they perceive their treatment when cases go to reconciliation, would
also increase understanding of the victims' perspective and promote that
perspective in criminal policy development. Legislatures and courts should
simply preclude reconciliation in certain types of cases. Until the criminal
justice system better protects victims of domestic violence and sexual
assault, and until criminal justice professionals understand and take these
crimes more seriously, these cases should not go to reconciliation.
The criminal justice systems of each country reflect the corruption
endemic to the region. In this environment, almost any change to the system
offers new opportunities for corrupt practices. A process that gives the
investigator the power to divert the case to reconciliation or gives the
prosecutor or judge the opportunity to review, open, or remand the case after
the parties reach a reconciliation agreement (as in Kazakhstan) raises
concerns about corruption. Use of a truly neutral third party as the
facilitator, someone other than the investigator with the authority to dismiss
the case, could reduce pay-offs to the investigator. Of course, creating new
professions within the criminal justice system does create the possibility of
new and additional parties expecting bribes.
Any international aid provider that wants to work in this area needs to
understand the context in which Central Asian countries are developing
alternatives to criminal proceedings. However, providers cannot discount
this trend, ignore it, or condemn it. Instead international aid providers, while
acting with great caution to avoid encouraging the uncritical spread of
alternatives to criminal proceedings in Central Asia, should also, as
appropriate, assist in developing a deeper understanding of the issues
involved in using these alternative processes. Currently, all four countries
need to adopt practices that protect defendants, victims, and the integrity of
the process. Western restorative justice values and practices may offer some
practical solutions for some of the problems appearing in Central Asian
reconciliations.
Within the context of current practices in the criminal justice systems of
Central Asia, reconciliation does not offer a panacea or quick fix to serious
structural problems, entrenched attitudes about certain crimes, or corrupt
practices. Those working for criminal justice reform in Central Asia must
encourage greater discourse surrounding these issues to ensure that
developing practices represent true reform rather than merely new examples
of bad practices.
